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PREFACE 
It is the purpose or this research to determine the contri-
buting factors in the banking crises of 1907 and 1929-33. The 
latter crisis shows that precautions taken after the catastrophe 
of 1907 were not auff1c1ent to avert one which proved even more 
serious. Thia study, however, is limited to those elements which 
were responsible for the widespread breakdown of the banking 
system. 
D1s~u~aions or each of these crises and the legislation which 
followed, occupied page after page of the country's newspapers 
for days, weeks, and months. All worthwhile periodical• carried 
views of the nation's outstanding commentators. The Congressioml 
Record bore testimony of the debates which preceded all legisla-
tion. Numerous other sources, both primacy and secondary, make 
possible the weighing of evidence, which alone makes research of 
value. Thia material may be•found in the Chicago Public Library, 
the Newberry Library, the Crerar Library, and in the library of 
the First National Bank of Chicago. 
G.ratitude !s hereby expressed to Reverend Joseph Roubik, S.J., 
and Dr. Paul Klniery for the interest shown by them in my work; 
and in particular to Mr. John A. Zvetina for the many helpful 
suggestions and constructive criticisms necessary to the writing 
of this thesis. 
Esther H. Calvert . 
Chicago, February 1938 
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INTRODUCTION' 
Many reasons have been advanced regarding the Nation's 
financial collapse in the year 1907. The· theory or panic cycle• 
promulgated by some is given little credence. Comparative atu~ 
hoaever, or the tangible reasons, through the use ot contempor-
aneous materials, replace abstract ideas with concrete tacts. 
From these facts we hope to arrive at the real solution or our 
problem. 
Because the banking problem 1s so very pertinent to our 
·subject, the entire first chapter la given over to that field, 
only to the extent which will serve to make meaningful the 
related matter. The panic of 1907 is dealt with in a more de-
tailed manner, tor too much emphaa~s cannot be laid upon the 
\-.,..,,(} /,' I , ) ..,, 
fact that !t was not a chance happening nor the result or care-
fully laid plans, but the outcome or a faulty banking system. 
The reforms which follow are merely the answer to a direct tieed 
/ . 
to safeguard the rinances of the pe~~le and nation. 
\\ .· /< . ,._. (" ., ·' ;., /~ L< , 
\With the Stock Market crash .or October, 1929, subsequent 
1nvest1gat1one and 1ncreae1ng bank failures, the average citizen 
•as again made aware of the unstable financial structure or the 
nation's banking institutions~] Once more was seen the need tor 
legislation which would tend to make more secure the savings of 
those whose earnings bad been placed in those institutions for 
safe keeping. This takes us to a discussion of the Glass-
steagall Bill, an amendment which modifies the Federal Reser'Ve 
Act, and which was passed during the Hoove~ administration; as 
~ well as the Banking Act of 1933. A comparative study of the 
crises will briefly digest the foregoing material, oa.111ng atten-
tion, in particular, to underlying causes, similarities and dis-
similarities, and remedial measures. 
CHAPTER I. 
HISTORY OF BANKING PRIOR TO 1907 - - - - - - -
The First United States Bank••Second United 
States Bank--Preaident Jackaon•e oppoe1t1on--
Pet Banka--The National Banking Syatem--Uae of 
bank depoaite tor induatrial expansion. 
CHAPTER I. 
HISTORY OF BANKING PRIOR TO 1907 
It was during the Presidency of Washington that Alexander 
Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, fostered the idea of a 
national bank as a means of improving the national credit of the 
new government. Such an institution he claimed would be instru-
mental in the sate keeping or public funds, transmission of 
public monies, collection of revenue, and in the making of loans~ 
In his "Report on a National Bank", which may be found in The 
Works of Alexander Hamilton, is the statement " ••• it is the mani-
fest design and scope or the Constitution, to vest in Congress 
all the powers requisite to the effectual administration of the 
finances of the United States ••• banks are the usual engine in 
the administration of national finances .. 2 • • • • 
Just as there bad been opposition to the adoption of the 
\Constitution because of its centralizing tendencies, there was 
oppoait1on to the bank. Its Republican opponents headed by 
Jefferson, maintained that the Constitution contained no prov1sicn 
1
• Great ·Debates in American Histoi:z, edltsed by Marion M. Miller 
tcurrent Literature Pub. Co., N. Y., 1913) Vol. 13. p~ 32 2
• The Works ot Alexander Hamilton, Comprisifif His Most Im-
~tant otHclal Reports, (Williams and w t!ng,.....-;-y-:; 1810) 
p. ig2. 
l. 
3 empowering Congress to Create the bank. 
2. 
With the success of the Federalists, however, the act 1noor-
porating the First United States bank in accordance with the plan 
submitted by Hamilton, made possible the opening of a central 
bank at Philadelphia on December 12, 1791. Its charter was for a 
4 period of twenty years. We will not concern ourselves with its 
operations, but will move on hurriedly to the year 1808 when the 
shareholders began to petition for the renewal of the charter 
which was to expire in 1811. Note only was this opposed by the 
adherents to the policy of strict construction of the Constitut1ai, 
but by the political enemies ot Gallatin, Secretary of the 
Treasury. He, in his report to the Senate, had stated that the 
Bank was "wisely and skillfully managed", and had urged that its 
charter be renewed. 5 
There was also an unfriendly attitude on the part of the 
many state banks which had been established since 1790, and which 
kept an eye to their own interests.a According to Roy Garia, 
Principles ,.2! Money, Credit ~ Banking, a motion to postpone 
action on rechartering the bank was passed 65 to 64, on January 
24, 1811. On February 20, 1811 a similar bill was passed in the 
~•Harold R. Bruce, American Parties !ru! Polit1ca,(Henry Holt and 
'-B~v!sNA.Y~6tiy~>Fina~§!al Hiatofl ot the United States, Long-
s,•ans, Green and Co.1 N • Y • 1 192 • p.- TOU. I !_bad.,p. 126, See a so Roy L. Garis, Princ1Elea or Money, Credit 
6 !!!_ Banking, Macmillan Co., N.Y., l93i, P• 3S. ~ 
•Dewey, p. 126. 
3. 
senate, against the bank, at which time the Vice-President voted 
against it in order to break a tied vote of 17 to 17.7 
Then came the War of 1812, and a disordered condition fol-
lowed making apparent the need of a banking institution which 
would exert a stabilizing influence upon the Government by 
1upplying financial revenue to the Treasury Department, and by 
restoring a national currency or circulating medium. The Govern-
ment had been forced to depend upon state banks, and when these 
bad suspended specie payments, the Treasury operations were 
paralyted. 8 
It was at thia time that John c. Calhoun of South Carolina, 
despite his former viewpoint or strict construction, became a 
etaunch advocate of the measure which would charter the second 
bank. He intimated that it might be a means of compelling state 
banks to return to specie payments. This he did by focusing the 
attention of the members of the House of Representatives upon the 
provision in the Constitution whereby Congress waa empowered to 
regulate the currency or the United States.9 After much pro and 
,.22!! debate, the bank was rechartered on April 101 1816, and began 
operations on January 7, 1817. Charter provisions of both banks 
were similar. The first bad established eight branchea, whereaa 
V•Garis, p: 539~ -· ---- --------· -------
a.Charles A. Conant, A H1sto~ of Modern Banks Sl!, Ieeue, G. P. 
9 Putnamsta Sons, N. !., 191 , p; 341. 
•Great Debate• !a American H1atorz, Vol. 13, PP• 54•55. 
th• second operated twenty•five. 
one authority states, nthe Bank of the United States fell 
because so great an institution in a representative republic 
could not escape political entanglements and the auep1oion or 
th• abuse or power.•10 so.it is that we find hostility arising 
in 1829 when President Andrew Jackson questioned the wisdom or 
rechartering it. Behind his attitude lay political intrigue 
which prompted bis condemnation ot the 1nst1tut1on. In hie 
annual message to congress in 1829 1 he said, "Both the consti-
tutionality and expediency or the law creating the bank are 
11 
well questioned by a portion of our fellow citizens •••" 
4. 
Thus the bank became one of the lasuea ot the campaign or 1832, 
and with Jackson's victory came the removal or its funds to 
aelected state or "Pet bank••" 
About this time many state banka expanded their note c1r-
oula t1on and became involved in land speculations. Then came 
the accompanying collapse of 1837, with the suapenaion of 
10
·conant, P• 349. 
It might be said that the Supreme Court had passed on the 
issue of chartering a bank 1n two oaaea, McCUlloch va 
Maryland and Oaborn va Bank. See Walter Dodd, Oaaee and 
t~5~yri8:•se-i!!J8n~'!:ut1onal ~ (West Pub. Oo., St.'Taul, 
1l•James A .• Richardaon, A Com,1lat1on ot the Meaaa~ea and 
Papers or the Presidents l 89-1897,-YuO:-by Aut~or1~ot 
~ongreai'; ivm:>. Vol. 2, pp;-16~28-9,· 576-91. See alao 
Dewey, p. 200. 
5. 
ipecie payments by banks 1n all sections of the country.12 
It has been noticed that change• in our banking structure 
result from national emergencies. So the national banking s7a-
tem prior to its modification by the Federal Reserve Act, was an 
outgrowth or the financial oriaia which accompanied the Civil 
war. Here we had the work of Chase, Secretary or the Treasury, 
1ponsored by President Lincoln. According to Dr. E. ~. 
Gcldenweiser, Director, Division of Research and Statistics or 
the Federal Reserve Board, "Banking, 1n the years between 1846 
and 1863, when the national system was initiated, waa under .the 
laws of the several atates ••• Under the national banking system, 
currency issues were safe but rigidly 1nelast1c."13 
The national banking system was not at all satisfactory but 
despite agitation for reform, the inconveniences and hardships of 
the cr1s1s of 1907 had to be undergone before any concerted ef-
fort wae made to remedy the a1tuat1on.14 Because of the decen-
tralized nature of the banking ayatem, banks had no means of 
oooperat1ng or acting jointly in times or stress. Too, there 
was no manner by which the scattered reserves of the bank• might 
be mobilized at such a time.15 
12
·E. A. Goldenwe1eer,nH1gh11ghs in History of .American Bankillg 
Legislation", Con,reaaional Digest, Munsey Bldg., Waah. D.C •. 
l (Dec. 1931) Vol. O, P• 292. 3
•congress1onal D1~est, (Dec. 1931) Vol. 10, P• 292. 14.Fr~der!ck A. Bra ford, Money ~ Banking, Longmans, Green and 
~~., N.Y., 1936, P• 327. 
15.Roy L. Garis, Principles of Mon7i' Credit and Banking, 
Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1§34; P• 2. ~ 
e. 
It may be w1ae to pauee here and. conaider the nature ot the 
lnY••tmenta made b7 the 1nat1tut1ona known aa banka. Between the 
,-ar• 1850 and 1900, bankers permitted oorporationa which were 
building ra1lrao4a, or were engaged 1n mining and manut acturine;, 
, 0 borrow much money. S1noe there waa not enough mone7 in 
,_.r1oa to develop ita natural reaourcea aa rapic1l7 aa waa 
d"alred, ma111 Europeane, part1cular17 the Bngl1eh1 loaned. large 
tum• to Carnegie and Rooketeller. Banker• were inat:rumental in 
bringing thia money trom Europe and putting it to work in devel• 
oping American lnduatl"y. J. P. Morgan waa such an 1ntermed1•1"'1• 
'l'b1• industrial activity aerved to increase the wealth ot the 
American people, and their depoaita began to 1ncreaae. Thua by 
19001 bankers had become "Maetera ot Induetrr and Capital• be• 
oauee they controlled, •••n though they did not own. those 
1nduatr1ea which had been heavy bol'l"owera. 
For at least six years preceding the panic it had been 
known tb.at a few oapitaliata had been actively engased in apeGu-
lat1ve 1nduatr1al schemes ot their own, gaining therebJ' control ot 
a group ot banks through mere stock ownership. They controlled 
the board of directors and uaed the tunda of these banks 1n 
their own deala. Truat companies had entered the general tield 
ot banking aleo. Banke which were subject to 1netant call ror 
caah by their depositor• were not permitted 1nve:stments which 
COUld not be converted quickly into cash. Trust companies were 
7. 
not considered subject to such demands. Despite this distinction, 
·'IOIJ11Y trust companies had accepted deposits, undertaking to carry 
on the same kind of business the banks were doing. 16 
It was in 1908 that .Andttew Carnegie spoke or our banking 
system as being the worst in the world.17 We find outselvea 
wondering whether or not he may have had such conv1ot1ona prior 
to the crisis of 1907, when the New York Clearing House demanded 
that trust companies keep a fifteen per cent cash reserve 1n 
their vaults, if they wished clearn1ng house privileges. With 
the exception or a few, however, the trust companies rejected 
the ultimatum, saying that they were strong enough to clear for 
themselvee.18 Then came the crash which proved their weakness. 
16.Arthur M. Schlesinger, Political and Social History ot the 
United States 1829·1925 {iacm.!1!an-a-o., N. Y7, 1929)"1).~9. 
17.0utiook, out!oOlf'"'C'o-;;-R'. Y., (Feb. 1908) Vol. as, PP• 487-89. 
~ee also The N!tion, New York Evening Post Co., N. Y., (Dec. 2e.-,:ga11 Vol. as, P• sao. 
la.The Nation, (Oct. 31, 1907) Vol. 85, P• 387. 
----
CHAPTER II. 
THE BANKING CRISIS IN THE PANIC OF 1907--
Cauae-•Effect upon the nation as a whole--
Need for remedial legislation. 
CHA?rER II. 
THE BANKING CRISIS IN THE PANIC OF 1907 
Every panic calls for its presidential scapegoat, so by 
many, the one ot 1907 is attributed to prosecutions carried on 
by President Theodore Roosevelt aga1net illegal eomb1nat1ona. 
Thie, however, was not a juat accusation for he had no part in 
setting in motion the destructive machinery of Wall Street. Most 
contemporary writers expreae this view. Even the Spect~, an 
English publication ot the period, when commenting on the 
".American wheel ot credit• and the President's treatment ot 
financial magnates, refutes the idea.l In the years preoed1ng 
the panic there had been a most unusual expansion throughout the 
world. One writer anticipating a erials, 1e., the eollapae or 
the money market, believed it would be due to excessive enter-
prise; and aa early as 1906 had suggested two ways to avert disas-
ter, namely: check the paoe of enterprise; provide sufficient 
funds to make ·a money famine 1mpossible.2 
1
•spectator Ltd., edited by John Baker, London. (October 1907) 
P• 593. -2
·N. Johannsen, !h!. Coming Cr1a1a ~ ~ !2, !!!!!, It, w. Y. 1907. 
a pampblet. 
a. 
The symptoms of the approaching crisis were: wonderful 
prosperity as shown by enterprises and schemes of all sorts; rise 
in the prices of all commoditiea: request tor workmen and the 
r1•• in salaries; growing luxury; small reserve in specie and 
decreasing deposite.3 It was Paul M. Warburg, author of!!!!, 
Federal Reserve System !E!. Origin !!!.9. Growth, who, when speaking 
-
ot the panic or 1907, stated, 
"It was one of the tragic defects or the American 
banking system at that time that, while disasters 
of this kind were the automatic consequences ot 
over-expansion, there was no posa1b111ty ot avert-
ing them by timely preventive collective action. 
There was no government or private authority that 
could assume leadership in warning the country or 
that had actual power to put on the brakes if the 
car were moving too fast and heading tor the 
preo1p1ce."4 
our concrete example deals with the activities or an am• 
bit1ous Montana miner by the name of F. Auguatus Heinze. He had 
lost heavily through the failure ot the Amalgamated syndicate 
which had btien sponsored by the National City Bank ot New York 
City, and financed by J. P. Morgan. Mr. Heinze had then forced 
two high finaneiera, Jamee Stillman, preaident of the City Bank, 
and Henl'J" H. Rogers, director or Standard 011, to make a large 
t1nancial settlement to him, thereby humiliating themaelvea. He 
then took his millions to New York and combined with Charles w. 
3•Clement Juglar, A Brief Historz ot Panics and Their Periodical 
Occurrence in the uri!ted Sta tea Tl. }S. f>utiiiii• a Sons, N. Y. 
!916) PP• 7-:Yo-;--
4•Paul M. Warburg, The Federal Reserve Slatem _!!!, Or1,1n and 
Growth, Macmillan-ec:>., N. !., 1§30. Vo • I. PP• 1!- 6. · 
J 
10. 
Jorae, a shipping magnate, Ruaaell Thomae, a well-to-do sportsman, 
.,id Charles T. Barney, president of the Knickerbocker Trust Com-
pany, which had reserves or more than seventy million dollars.5 
The old line trust companies which were dominated by J. 
Pierpont Morgan and his partner, Robert Bacon, by William Rocke-
teller, a speculator, by Henry Rogers and James Stillman, could 
not sit idly by and watch the encroachment or this new banking 
group upon their long established monarchj". 6 
The year 1907 had opened with a strained money market, as 
was shown by the Hew York Stock Market which is the barometer or 
business conditions. Despite the disturbing element, 1.e., 
President Roosevelt's attitude toward unacrupuloua men or wealth, 
the Heinze, Morse, Thom.as combine made heavy loan.a in an attempt 
to corner the market on United Copper.7 
Five days preceding the historic date which marked the 
beginning or the panic, the !!.!! York Dally Tribune carried a 
front page article captioned, "Big Copper Crash Sends Firm To 
Wall." The firm referred to was that of Gross and Kleeberg, al-
leged Heinze brokers. They stated that they had bought stock tor 
the Heinze people who now refused to take it off their handa. 8 
The next day's issue contained two items which bore a direct 
5•Charlea A. Collman, Our ~sterioua Panics 1830•1930, William 
Morrow and co., N.Y.;-!93 .p. 268. Sei aliiOlr.S. Glaasock, The 
War of the Cof!er Kin~a, Builders of Butte, and Wolves ot ----
Wi!l ~triit,he Bob a Merrill co-:-N.Y., 19~ chapterS-21-22. 
6.C'Oiiman, P• 268. 
7.101a. 
8,!!!!, !.2.£! Daily Tribune, Oct. 17, 1907. 
ll. 
relationship. One, "Otto Heinze and Compan7 forced to suspend", 
and the other, "F. Augustus Heinze gives up bank pres1dency. 0 
Ill'• Heinze had been elected president ot the Mercantile National 
sank in January, after the Heinze, Morse, Thomas combination took 
over the Gould interests. Although he had already denied any 
personal interest in the market position of United Copper, 
Heinze gave as his reason tor resigning that, his brothers• firm 
now in difficulty, needed all his attention. Othera in the bank-
ing circle were of the opinion that because his brothers were 
identified with the United Copper corner and the manipulations 
which brought about its collapse, Heinze had considered it best 
to retire from the presidency.9 
This was just the opening which his enemies bad sought. 
Immediately, they called loans on all securities of all com-
panies with which Heinze, Morse and Thomas were associated. 
Under pressure, the directors of the Mercantile Bank resigned, 
tor even though the bank was found to be solvent, aid waa denied 
it by the Clearing House Committee until a change in stock control 
had been etfeoted.lO 
The Clearing House Committee 1 s 1nveat1gat1on did not atop 
here. They thought it wise to assertain the status of other 
aasociated institutions. While so doing they discovered that 
9
•New York Daill Tribune, Oct. 18, 1907. See also Hearings Before 
·S' mi.ttee on Bankl!!f and Currencl, United States Senate, 
10~cong.I. Sess. aov•t~rlnt. 5r?1ce, 1~13, Vol. 3.pp.~7ao-64 !!! ~ Daill Tribune, Oct. 19, 1907. 
12. 
tb• position of the Kniokerboeker Trust Company was dangerous. 
Charles T. Barney, ita president, resigned saying that in such 
perilous times be felt that the poa~t1on could be better tilled 
b1 someone elae. Be claimed that the institution waa sound and 
that he was unaware or any refusal ot the National Bank of Com-
merce to continue clearing from the Knickerbocker Trust Com.-
11 p&nY• But, when the Knickerbocker applied for aid, auoh waa 
denied it, and it waa forced to close 1ta doors. Thua, what was 
at that time considered the most formidable run or bank deposi-
tors 1n the history of banking, followed the enforced retirement 
ot Barney. 12 
Alexander D. Noyea, in the January 1908 issue of the Forum, 
appropriately stated, ua1story will set the beginning of the 
1907 panic on October 22, the day the iliickerbocker Trust Com-
pany closed ita doors ••• the date when the public first ehowed 
signs of the sudden collapse of depoaitors• confidence which 
marked the series ot troubled weeks which tollowed.nl3 The 
Chicago Da1!Y' Tribune, ~t this time conveyed. the new1 that Gotham 
was on the br1nk,o.t a Pl\llic; and that President Theodore 
Roosevelt; while speaking at Nashville; Tenneaaee, made it clear 
that he was 1n no manner responsible tor the t1nano1al situation 
and general uneasinesa.14 A portion ot this apeeoh read; 
ll•Forum, Forum Pub. Oo., N. Y., (Jan. 1908) P• 297. ll~·New York Dail! Tribune, Oct. 22, 1907. 
"'• F'Orum--;-T Jan• 90'7) p. 294. 
14.cfiicago Daill Tribune, Oct. 23, 1907. 
13. 
• ••• these policies of mine can be summed up in one brief sen-
•tence. They represent the effort to punish sucoeastul dishonesty. 
••• All I did waa to turn on the light. I am responsible tor 
turning on the light, but I am not responsible tor what the light 
abowed. It was impossible to cut out a cancer without making the 
patient reel for a few days sicker than he ·relt before."15 
At Washington. however, the entire financial machine aet to 
work to do whatever possible to avert widespread financial ditfi• 
oulties. These otticials and bakera were of the opinion that the 
disturbance could be confined to the Bew York area. Secret&...""'7 of 
the Treasury, Corteltou, went to Hew York• and after conferring 
with leading bankers and financiers on the local banking situa-
t 
tion, deposited $1,000,000.00 ot government mone7 1n each of six 
or seven national banks ot that city. Not one penny of aid was 
given the Knickerbocker Truet Company trom outside eourcea.16 
· The Chicago banks aa yet experienced no dift1cultiea, but 
they kept in cloae touch with the New York situation. On 
Thursday, October 24, news came that the trouble which began in 
Bew York, had spread to Pittsburg• but that the Chicago banka 
were still solid. The following reason was given tor Chicago's 
good fortune: "Chicago banka have not been and are not specu-
lating in real estate ••• A corps of special bank examiners 
15. New York Dailz Tribune, Oct. 23., 1907. 
16. Ibid. 
-
14. 
employed by the Chicago Clearing House Aasoe1at1on keeps the 
association's committee informed of an1 irregularities in the 
o1,t1' s banks at their inception. Thus, no costly deception could 
iong continue in any bank.•17 
According to a London publication, !.!.!!. Dailz Telegraph, vi• 
cable to the Chioa~o Da1lz Tribune, "Mr. Roosevelt's object is 
beyond reproach. He desires to strike at the gu1lt7 and di•• 
honest in high places ••• But ia 1t abaolutel7 neceeaa17 that the 
sky should be dragged down in,order to catch the few larka that 
1r. Rooaevelt is bent on nett1ngt•18 Thie brief expression 
leads one to believe that the English viewpoint was that despite 
his good intentions, the Pree1dent•e anti-truat speeches pre-
, 
c1p1tated the panic. 
Glancing here and there over the country by an examination 
ot news articles• the banking conditions in the leading cities 
were still favorable. New England conditions were about the 
same as before the collapse or the Heinze Oopper corner, 
Philadelphia was unaffected; Ohio waa serene; Indiana banks were 
able to supply the legitimate demands of their customers, while 
St. Louie and Kanaaa Cit7 were unperturbed. Minneapolis declared 
herself nr1rm and stable•, while the Dakotas were in tine shape. 
17. ChiC!SO Dall~ Tribune, Oct. 24, 1907. 
18. !bfd. 1 Oct. 5, 1907. 
-
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Atlanta boasted of normal bank withdrawals; New Orleans was un-
a1armed and Memphis was ready to meet any emergency. The Rocky 
10unta1n states were not disturbed, for Portland, Los Angeles and 
san Francisco were in a condition to lend money to the east if it 
were needed. 
The next day told a different story. Goldfield, Nevada 
banks closed in consequence of the governor's proclamation of a 
holiday. This was a relief to local banks because of runs and 
the closing of the State Bank. Runs also occurred in Baltimore, 
Maryland, and Providence, Rhode Ialand.19 
The monied men of New York began to express themselves and 
J. Pierpont Morgan avered that the fight had been practically 
won, and that the people should keep their heads. John D. 
Rockefeller intimated that depositors, big and little, should 
turnish money to remedy the muddle, 1.e., become composed and let 
money work as usual. E. H. Harriman declared the New York banks 
to be sound and able to stand, it the people stood by them. He, 
too, urged tolerance, prudence and coolneas. 20 
A tew days later the President congratulated Mr. Cortelyou, 
and the financiera who aided him in the crisis. From the White 
House he wrote, 1•My Dear Mr. Cortelyou ••• The action taken by 
you and by the business men in question, has been of the utmost 
19. Chicago Dailz Tribune, Oct. 25 1 190'7. 
20. !bid • 
............... 
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consequence and has secured opportunity tor the calm considera-
tion which must inevitably produce entire confidence in our 
bus1nes~ conditions.•21 Despite these statements by t1nanc1ers 
and by the President, unrest and bank runs continued and some 
banks began to require notice tor withdrawals. 
By cable from London came a news item from London Eoonomista 
Frank w. Hirst, editor of the Economist, and George Paiah, edi-
tor of the Statist, claiming that American business had gone 
ahead of cash, but that the depression would not laat long. In 
discussing the way London differed trom New York, they said, 
"(1) we dontt deposit money 1n sham banks. (2) Our banke do not 
speculate. (~) We have a sound banking syetem. (4) Engliahmen•a 
nerves are not so lightly strung as Americana and consequently 
there is not so much histronica here during temporary diaarrange-
ment. "22 
From Paris came the comments of French financial writers on 
America's monetary or1sis 1 conveying the idea that they, too, 
held President Roosevelt aa the key to the situation. Said one, 
"Becoming politically important accidentally and late in life, he 
plunged head down into a study of all sooial1st1c theories ••• It 
is the ill fortune or Preaident Roosevelt and .the Amer1~ana that 
those dreams presented themselves to his mind first atter he 
21. Chicago Dailz Tribune, Oct. 27. 1907. 
22.· Ib!d. 
-
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reached power and was in position to make them effective." Said 
another, "He excites popular envy and legislates not tor the 
future, but to draw a crowd around h1m.n23 
Claiming he had brought the country to the brink of ruin, 
Roosevelt was blamed in unmeasured terms, in the highest German 
banking circles, for the panic. A director of an institution 
having extensive American relations, said, '*We hold the President 
solely responsible ror agitating public opinion and undermining 
public confidence in what is a perfectly sound situation. He 
seems to have forgotten Rockefellers, Morgans, and Harriman.a, 
can lose millions without feeling it but ••• that there are tens 
ot thousands to whom this upheaval will mean eternal ruin.n24 
At the same time trom Berlin came a statement, "The violent fin&.J.t. 
c1al squall in the United States is regarded here as having 
passed. The great Berlin banks are assuring their customers 
that the cr1e1a which tor a week has gripped New York is relaxing 
and that conditions in America are so sound that no deep seated 
consequences can tollow.n25 
Clearing Bouse Cert1t1catea were resorted to as a meane ot 
bringing about normal oond1t1ona. Such a certificate is 
emergency currenc7 to be used by banks only, secured b7 
collateral which is accepted at aevent7-five per cent of its 
23. Chicago Da1lz Tribune, Oct. 27. 1907. 
24. !bra. 
25. New ~ork Da1lz Tribune, Oct. 28, 1907. 
.18. 
face value. Unlike the bank note its use is restricted to pay-
ment of daily balances· at the olearning house. 26 New York, st. 
Louis, Pittsburgh, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, Mil-
waukee, Omaha and Indianapolis issued such cert1f1oatea.27 
Their use showed the need for currency retorm. Since they 
prevented the withdrawal of large sums, money was kept in Chicago 
banks, and few depositors sought to withdraw funds. In New York, 
although runs on banks had not ended, demands were being met. So, 
with affairs on the upgrade, London, Paris and Berlin began to 
wax optimistic over this "rich manta cr1s1a and poor man's pan1<l.n28 
Taking every precaution to avoid any acts which might 
disturb the calm which had begun to settle upon hie city, 
Comptroller Meta of New York CitJt held back part of the eala17 
checks usuall7 paid on the first of the month, deciding to distri-
bute ~hem over five daya. Hie purpose was to prevent a renewal 
of any reeling of disquiet which might accompany the apectacle ot 
long lines or policemen, firemen, school teachers, street sweepere, 
and other city employees dashing 1n the thirty-five city deposi-
tories on Saturday.29 
By October 31st, the financial skies seemed to be free from 
clouds, for reports from all sections of the country, to the 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
Chicago nn1if Tribune, oct. 28, 1907. 
Rew York a I Tribune, Oct. 28, 1907. 
Clilca:go-Da!lt Tribune, Oct. 29, 1907. 
New York Dil l Tribune• Oct. 31, 1907. 
19. 
government officials, showed rapid improvement. Not one demand 
for Clearing House assistance came that day from New York. 
ouring the next two days the press carried auch statements as, 
"America has grown taster than means provided for ita develop-
ment ••• More bank notes will ease the strain", and, "Crisis 1s 
iever to money reform. Need for a more elastic currency 1a em-
phasized by the recent financial disturbanoe--preaent system 
1nade qua te • u30 
The natural tendency of individuals during a panic is to 
bold on to all cash, thus making a condition which is alread1' 
bad, worse. It is therefore necessary to devise some plan to 
draw this boarded currency out or biding. So it was that Wall 
Street brokers advertised an offer to pay 1n certified cbeoka on 
New York banka; a premium of one and one•halt per cent tor any 
kind of currency. Employers of labor with their large weekly or 
monthly payments could not wait until o,aah became more plentiful, 
and it was they, direotly or indirectly through their banka 1 who 
had employed the Wall Street broker• to announce the premium for 
. 
currency. The result was successful for soon the boarded money 
began to appear.31 
Presidef?.t Roosevelt was urged to C·all Congreea. The White 
House was. deluged with petitions asking national action on the 
30. Chicago Daill Tribune, Nov. 2, 1907. 
31. The Nation, Nov. 1907) Vol. 85. 
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tinancial crisis, but the President did not feel that the situa-
tion justified the calling of a special session. He did, how-
ever, decide to aid currency reform and to recommend that 
congress devise some plan tor greater elaat1o1ty in the circula-
ting medium. It was only a few days later that Mr. Meyer, head 
of the Government Mail Department, made hie plea for postal 
eavings banks, and explained how euoh a project would tend to 
promote prosperity within the United Statea.32 
Summarizing•, we might say that the conditions which brought 
on the crisis had accumulated over many years. Nowhere had over• 
trading and over-expanding been greater than in the. United 
1 States, and though some sort of let down may have occurred, it 
need not have taken the .form of a pan1c;.1f a better banking and. 
currency system had existed. 
As one peruse a articles which have b•um written on this par' .. 
ticular crisis, contemporaneous and otherwise, one finds himself 
being convinced that it was a rich maxi•a panic: that it was the 
mon1ed people, those who have always controlled the Stock Ex• 
change, who suffered; not the people at large. No sane person 
can be of the opinion that the collapse was a planned atrkir even 
though the unfortunate bicker1ngs in Wall Street supplied the 
necessary· momentum, serving thus ae the immediate ,oauae. 
~2. Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 6, 1907. 
21. 
New York, the money center of the country, reflected an in• 
fluence upon the nation as a whole, with the exposure of the 
speculative practices or men high 1n finance. The reaction ot 
small depositors was a natural one, as was that ot the western 
banks in reducing their tunds at the eastern center. With the 
dawn or the new year the financial scare faded, and as the money 
outlook improved, the business world again became optimistic, 
but as Senator Bourne, before Congress on March 5, 1910, refuting 
the prediction of the junior Senator of New York that other 
panics would come, stated, "under normal conditions there will be 
no more panics in this country if capital 1a properly regula-
ted ••• n33 
33. Congressional Record, !!!, Cong. !• Seas. P• 2763. 
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CHAPTER III. 
THE POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM 
We now come to the first of the banking reforms resulting 
from the collapse of 1907, namely, the creation of the United 
states Postal Savings System. An extract from pamphlets issued 
by the United States Poat-office Department reads, "Between 1873 
and 1910, eighty bills relating to the eatabl1shment of postal 
savings were introduced in Congre•a, the last of which was enac-
ted into law in 19lo.n1 That the law was enacted is well and 
good, but let us consider the arguments which were used in an at• 
tempt to prevent it, and those which helped bring about ita 
enactment. 
During a period or approxi~ately forty years, the establish-
ment or such a system had been advocated by eight Postmaster 
Generals, but it was considered a matter of minor importance un-
til the pan1.c exposed the general lack of confidence in the 
existing banking institutions. That President Roosevelt favored 
the system was indicated in his December 1907 and March 1908 
messages to Congreas. 2 
l. 
2. 
Con.greaaional Di~eat, (Dec. 1931) Vol. 10, P• 296. 
E. w. Kemmerer,oatal Savings, Princeton Univ. Presa. 1917 
PP• 2•4. · 
22. 
23. 
In !a! Independent ot November 5, 1908, we tind an article 
bf Mr. George Von L. Meyer, Postmaster General ot the United 
states, "Much Needed Legislation", in which he says, 
" ••• there 1a a timid class which has only faith 
in Goverrosient institutions •• The Republican 
platform commits the Republican party to the 
adoption ot a postal savings bank law ••• The 
Department has had assurance that more than a 
majority or the Senate will support the bill •• 
Whetever opposition there may be to the propo-
sition by banking institution.a ia f'rom misun-
derstanding of its purposes or trom purely sel-
fish motives."3 
Mr. Charles E. Sprague, former president of the savings bank 
1ection of the American Bankers Aasoc1at1on; waa one to disagree 
with Mr. Meyer1. Hie view was that .few teared the ultimate 
solvency of the banks in 1907 1 but they wanted currenc7 at once. 
Therefore he claimed that peraona would have been just as eager 
to draw money trom. postal banks, to hoard or to sell that money, 
as any other money. It this had been the case he believed the 1 
Government would have had to retuse payment even though it had 
4 
agreed to repay upon demand. 
About the same time in the December 12th Outlook,. was an 
item which ma7 have served to oryatalize public opinion. It 
referred to the millions of dollar which were kept in hiding in 
those regions which lacked proper banking facilities, and had 
s. George Von L. Meyer, "Much Needed Legislation," The Inde-
A• ~endent, (Nov. 5, 1908) Vol. 65 PP• 1029-30. ---~ 
~ harlea E. Sprague, "Postal Savings Banks", The Independent, 
(Jan. 14, 1909) Vol. 66, P• 1549. ---
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00 confidence in private bankers. If post-offices were allowed 
to receive these savings on deposit the condition of economic 
waste would be relieved, for hoarded money would again oircu-
1ate. 5 Persons who began saving small amounts in the postal 
1av1ngs banks, would, as their deposits grew, realize the advan-
tage of depositing in a regular savings bank, because of the 
higher interest rate. In this way the poatal institutions would 
be or aid to the established banka.6 
Again, however, we find opposition. Mr. John Harsen 
Rhoades, a trustee ot one of the leading savings institutions in 
the city or New York, objected to the principle and methods 
which would be employed. He had the idea that such a system 
would increase the centralized powe~a ot the Federal Government, 
and stated that he had a distaste for anything like Government 
' 
absorption of private enterprise. The Outlook opinion waa that 
- .. 
there existed no dangerous tendency toward centralization of 
' 
power in the Federal Government, and that people didn•t resent 
Government management 1t it were more effective than private 
management.7 
When d1acuaa1ng the Carter Bill which waa then before Con-
gress. Mr. Rhoades stated, "The time may arrive when postal 
eavings banks will be a necessary adjunct to our financial life; 
but, inasmuch as today our national banking system ia antiquated 
-5. Outlook, (Dec. 12, 19085 Vol. 90. P• 802. ed. 
6, '.td. 
7. !bid., (Jan. 16, 1909) Vol. 91, P• 99 ed. 
-
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and inadequate to our needs, why saddle upon it a weight of a 
postal savings project? Would it not be well for those interes-
ted in establishing postal savings banks to bide their time and 
wait until our system of banking has improved? Banking and cur-
rency reform should precede the postal savings bank.n8 
In refutation of arguments presented by those who opposed 
his project, Mr. Thomas B. Carter, sponsor of the bill, spoke 
well in its defense• He said, 
nA cursory examination of the map and of the laat 
census returns will demonstrate that approximately 
one-half ot the total population of the United 
states ab1dea in places having no savings banks at 
all. Since it is conceded that savings .fac111t1ea, 
coupled with confidence in the banks, will encour-
age thrift, keep money in circulation, insure more 
home comforts, and develop better citizenship, the 
queat1on naturally ariaes. Why not make so.me ef .... 
fort to extend the ben1f1cent influence of sound 
savings 1nst1tutiona to the one-halt of our popu-
lation which does not now enjoy the advantages 
common to those residing in or near the great 
centers of population? Certain cherished tao111-
t1es for saving small amounts of money now enjoyed 
by some ot the people can be extended to all the 
people in a lawful way and without expense to the 
Government or injury to anyone, and the postal 
system has the macbine27 installed and in opera-
tion thru which such facilities may be extended 
to the patrons or every one ot the 40,000 post-
otficea in the country."9 
When Kansas City, Missouri postal otficiala were making an 
investigation, to ascertain why large numbers of money orders 
8. John Haraen Rhoades, •postal Savings Banks", Outlook,(Jan.1909) 
Vol. 91, P• 118. 
9. Thomas H. Carter, "Postal Savings Banks•, I!!!. Independent, 
(Jan. 1909) Vol. 66. PP• 74•75. 
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bad not been presented for payment, they discovered that immi-
grant laborers had been using the post-office as a savings bank. 
They had become familiar with such in Europe and, having a 
distrust of American banks, had followed the example of one of 
their group. This clever man would buy money orders which, if 
not presented tor payment in a year, were turned over to the 
Treasury department where a ce~~1f1cate tor the amount of the 
order was made out. Such a certificate, non interest bearing, 
was good indefinitely. Thus, the Government became his banker.lo 
For over seventy days the bill was under consideration by 
the Sixtieth Congress and was then passed on to 1ta successor, 
the Sixty-first Congress. In the course or the debate every 
legitimate objection was presented. These were, however, just as 
ably and zealously re.futed. 11 Again Mr• Carter came to its de-
tense. 
"The frequently recurring panioa from. which 
we have auf.feHd ••••• have been more destructive 
than the ware in which we have engaged. The 
financial disorders which have reaulted' from 
pan1ca trom time to time have been born ot fear 
and diatruat. The experience of the past in 
this particular will be repeated in the future 
until we provide some depository in which the 
vast army ot wage earners and otm ra or small 
means have absolute oont1dence •••• It follows, 
therefore, that the postal savings system will 
10. Outlook, (Aug. 28, 1909) Vol. 92, P• 965. 
11. Thomas H. Carter, "Poatoffice as a Depository for Savings", 
North American Review (Apr. 1910) Vol. 191. P• 450. 
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be a powerful agency working most efficiently 
to preserve the equilibrium in times of finan-
cial disturbance. Finally th1a system will 
beget interest in and devotion to the Government.nl2 
Despite the fact that some termed it "paternal1at1c 1 reck-
less and socialistic", the b1ll, after much consideration passed 
the Senate by more than a two-thirds majority, and was sent on 
13 to the House of Representatives. When tinally accepted by this 
body, it was sent to President William B. Taft, by whom it was 
signed on June 251 l9lo.14 
In the examination of the United States Postal Sav1:pga !!!! 
and Its Amendmenta, only the sections pertinent to the general 
--
theme of thie chapter, will be cited. We find that it 1a, 
"An Aet to establish postal savings depositories for depositing 
savings at interest with the security of the government tor re-
15 payment thereof, and tor other purpoaesn. Through its enact-
ment there was created, a board of trustees which would control• 
supervise, and administer the postal aav1nga depository offices 
that had been designated and established under the provisions of 
the aot. It would in like manner take charge of the funds re-
ceived aa deposits. The board was to consist of the Postmaster 
General, the Secretary ot the Treasury, and the Attorney General, 
12. Ibid., P• 455. 
13. nut!ook, (Mar. 1910) Vol. 94, P• 594 ed. 
14. Kemmerer, P• 2. 
15. ~¥!lft¥~e~Mai-t-fta~~·\\~~ tt\'!s5~. ~ai~tl•• (Gov•t 
28. 
acting~ officio, and-having power to make proper regulations to 
receive, transmit, deposit, invest and repay the funds deposited 
at postal savings depoa1tor1ea. In Seo. 3. we find that the 
board of trustees was authorized and empowered to state which 
post offices should be postal savings depoa1tor1ea. Every post 
office ao designated was authorized and required to receive de• 
posits of funds from. the public. Each depoaitOl"J waa to account 
for and dispose ot all funds, according to the provisiorus and 
regulations or the Postal Savings Act. Postal savings depository 
tunds·were to be kept separate from other tunda. Postmaster1, 
and other officers and employees or the postal service, were to 
be held accountable tor such funds as, "the faith or the United 
States is solemnly pledged to the payment ot the depoaita made 1n 
postal savings depository oft1oea with accrued interest thereon 
as herein prov1ded ••• nl6 
In keeping with this act, the tirst 1nst1tutiona of this 
kind were opened tor business on January 3, 1911, at which 
time one such bank waa opened in each state and territory. When 
the fiscal 1ear 1913 came to a close, 12,151 depoa1tor1es had 
been established. Thus it is that this type ot bank, designated 
to absorb the depoa1ts or timid depositors, flourlahea today.17 
16. Ibid. PP• 814-19. 
17. kemmerer, PP• 5~, 128. 
29. 
We ahall find that these depositories became more and more 
popular as confidence in banking institutions failed. 18 On 
February 28, 1933 deposits reached the billion dollar mark.19 
Because of this, opposition became ao bitter that the Seventy-
tbird Congress was urged to abolish postal savings banks. This, 
however, was not done, but it waa felt that the guaranty ot de-
posits provision in the Banking Act of 1933 would bring about a 
reduction of deposits in the postal savings banks.20 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Review of Reviews, (Feb. 1934) Vol. 90. p. 11. ed. 
CJarle, P. 944. 
Ibid., P• 947, see also The Bankers Ma,azine (The Bankers 
Pub. Co., Cambridge, MasS:-(iay 1933) ol. I26, p. 421. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 
The financial d1tf1cult1ea accompanying the depreaaion ot 
1907-08 were ao serious as to provide the final illustration and 
arguments necessary to bring the Federal Reserve System into 
existence. As the act whioh brought this aystem into being waa 
not passed until December 23, 1913, it 1• necessary tor ua to. 
take notice of the intervening event and attempt• at legislation. 
Senator Nelson w. Aldrich was, between 1907 snd 1912, the 
acknowledged leader in the movement tor banking and currency re-
form.1 Aa chairman of the National Monetary Commission which haa 
been created by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act or 1908, he began to 
formulate remedial measures. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act had pro-
vided for an emergency issue ot bank notes by groups or national 
banks, a temporary measure, aiming to relieve the financial 
stress until such time, that more suitable governmental legisla-
tion might be enacted. In the meantime the National Monetary 
Commission was to make a survey of banking conditions here and 
abroad, and to compile a report which should serve as the basis 
1. The Nation, (Aug. 1913) Vol. 97, P• 376. 
2. ~L. Laughlin• The Federal Reserve Act Its Origin ~ f!:.22.• 
lems, Macmillan "ffi>.', N. Y., 1§33) p.-r!.~ 
30. 
3 
ot the anticipated legislation. 
31. 
On Janua17 1-0, 1911, he presented to a group of Washington 
bUSiness men, the first draft of that which was later to become 
the basis of the Aldrich bill. Thia draft, while only tentative, 
bad as its outstanding feature the provision tor a central bank, 
which was in keeping with the interests ot Wall Street.4 After 
the neoesearr revision, the report of the Commission and the plan 
or bill were eent to Congress on January a, 1912. The bill never 
received full d1acuss1on in either house ot Congress, because 
the Monetary Oommisaion had been created during the Republican 
administration and its bill 1tood no chance of becoming law 
after the ehitt in power which came with the election ot Woodrow 
Wilson in November 1912.5 
President Wilson had made it clear both before and after hie 
election that he intended to have a "real and direct" connection 
with Congreaa1onal legislation. This determ1nat1ou, we shall see, 
was borne out by the exhibition or team work between the Presi-
dent and Congress in the passage of the Currency Bill or Federal 
Reserve Act. 6 
When the leading House Democrats were rather certain that 
no action. would be taken on the Aldrich bill, they devoted 
their time to political scheming. The House Banking Committee 
3. Bradford, p. 327. 
4. Laughlin, P• 16. 
5. Bradford, P• 329. See also Laughlin, P• 56. 
6. The Nation, Vol. 97, P• 136. 
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was divided, 1.e., halt to investigate the Money Trust, and the 
other halt under the chairmanship of Charter Glass to take up the 
~atter of banking legislation. It was this sub-committee under 
Mr. Glass which formulated the currency bill which waa eventually 
legislated as the Federal Reserve Act. 7 
As Mr. Glass was not active in opposition to the plans to 
investigate the Money Trust, he was left undisturbed in working 
out a banking bill. On January 301 1913 the first draft of his 
bill went to President Wilson. Having def1b1tely entered the 
political stage, it was now to be subjected to the whims of the 
political forces in Congress and other administrative influences. 
The measure was taken up at the extra aeasion of Congress, April 
1913, although it was not tor thia that the session had been 
a 
called. 
As the bill stood, there were .features which were bound to 
provoke opposition, and 1t was evident that this oppoa1t1on would 
center about the composition of the Federal Reserve Board. 
Bankers became fearful that control wo~ld be given over to poli-
ticians, and dqubtlesa there was some basis tor this fear. 9 
Such an opinion was expressed by Nathaniel French of the firm of 
French and Hecht, Manufacturers, Davenport, Iowa, when he ap-
peared before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in 
7. Lau.ghl1n, pp. l 00-1 Ol • 
8. Ibid., P• 138. 
9. IOia:., PP• 140-2. 
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October, 1913. Hi·s view was that tho Act 1 tself was a great re-
form and that good might be gained from its enactment, but he 
teared the ayatem would drift into pol1t1oa.lO 
To further bear this out, Laughlin cites Carter Glass's 
An Adventure In Constructive Finance, where W3 find, "•••the 
- -
P1•esident requested the House chairman, as compensation to 
bankers tor denial or representation on the central board, to set 
up a Federal A4viao17 Council, to be composed exclua1vel7 ot 
bankers, authorized to sit at times with the Federal Reserve 
11 Board in a purely advisor,. capacity." 
Bankers were not the only antagonists. Secretary William 
Jennings Bryan opposed 1t on the grounds that in some respects it 
did not conform to Democratic history nor doctrine. He maintained 
that it waa the function or the Government and not the banks, to 
issue money.12 We find that at a later date Father Coughlin 
maintained the aame idea. One ot the sixteen points ot h1a 
National Union tor Social Justice, calla tor a "central bank and 
a nationalized banking aystem."13 
lo. 
ll. 
12. 
13. 
Hearinls Before the Committee on Banki;t and Currenoz 
u. s.enate, 63G'Ong. l. Seas:-Gov•t riiir. orr!ce. Wash. 
Vol -;-3. p. 20'70. . 
Carter Glass, An Adventure In Constructive Finance, (Double-
aa1 Page ana co;, darden Citj', I. Y., 1927) p. 116. 
Laughlin, P• 154. 
Literad" Disest, (Mar. 23, 1935) Vol. 119. P• 7. see also 
Raymon Gram Swing, "Father Coughlin, The Wonder of Self 
Discovery", ~Nation, (Dec. 26, 1934) PP• 731•3. . 
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Strange as it may·be, however, when the House radicals, 
under the leadership of a Mr. Henry of Texas, who wished to curry 
the favor of Mr. Bryan, expressed themselves with venom against 
the bill, Mr. Bryan turned right about face and endorsed the 
bill.14 Another ambitious Cabinet member, who was antagonistic 
to the Glass bill, was Secretary McAdoo. Being spurred by per-
sonal aapirat1ons, he presented a bill which he claimed to be 
euper1or to that of Mr. Glass. His bill, he deemed a more prac-
tical one which met w1th the approval of many bankers, although 
be cited only one specitically.15 
So, says Mr. Laughlin, 
"Later the Glass bill, thus supported by the 
President in spite ot cr1tic1am ot Mr. Bryan, 
the revolt of Secretal"1 McAdoo, and the war-
fare ot the Aldrich group in New York, went to 
the Houee Democratic Caucus for approval Sep-
tember 11, 1913 ••• After minor changes in the 
cauoua, the fourth drart ••• as modified by the 
Banking Committee, was reported to the House 
•••• It was debated tor five day•• The main 
objections urged to the measure were aa to 
the powers granted the Federal Reserve Board, 
the compulsory membership ot the national 
banks and the transter of reserves. After an 
amendment by Mr .. Fess that nothing in the bill 
could be construed as a change in the gold 
standard ••• the bill passed the House September 
18, 1913 by a vote of 287--85. Thl'ee Democrats 
voted against the bill, 48 Republicans tor 1t 
and 82 against it."16 
14. Laughlin, P• 159. 
15. Ibid. 
16. ?t;IQ'., PP• 159-61 
-
During the period ot debate, Representative Hardwick, Demo-
crat of Georgia, assailed the Party's finance plan, saying that 
1t would "toeter banking monopol7 in which the government would 
be a party." He continued that in every- other branch or 
industry the Democratic party bad contended, 
"Down with monopoliea, combines and trusts ••• 
and yet it aeems likely that in this bill •••• 
we have eatabl1ahed a gigantic money trust, 
with all the banks or the country- concentrated 
in twelve great central banka, with the govern-
ment linked between them and the government in 
actual partnership, lending them money, 1aau1ng 
them money •••• In this bill it appears that we 
have abandoned the position taken b7 the Demo-
cratic party in the recent campaign, and have 
gone over, bag and baggage, to the Roosevelt 
(Theodore) position.•·• .Bear thia 1n mind: if the 
bill becomes a law 7ou will have prosperity, ex-
pansion, more loans, more eredite, boom times tor 
a while. The goose will bang high. But pay day 
comes with a nation, as well as with an 1nd.1v1d-
ual. "17 
Representative Kahn, ot Cal1forn1a, stated that he was a-
gainst the bill because Secretary of Stnte, Bry-an, was for it, 
and added that an7 proposed legislation which Mr. Bryan approved 
should be scrutinized carefully.18 
The bill was now sent to the Senate where changes were 
suggested because of the influence ot New York banking 1n-
teres ta upon the Senate, and becauae there were within the 
~mocrat1c·group, varied v1ewpo1nta regarding banking policy 
17. New York Tribune, Sept. 13, 1913. 
18. !E'f d-;--
-
and on the provisions of the bill. Only the "dominating force 
19 
of Mr. Wilson's leadership" made final action possible. In 
Joseph P. Tumulty 1 s, Woodrow Wilson!!! !!!.2! .!.!!!!li is a state-
ment to the effect that it is doubtful that many persona realize 
the character ot the opposition which President Wilson met even 
in the ranks of his own party. Representative Glaaa bad informed 
him that the stubborn opposition in the Committee, led by Demo-
cratic Senators 0 1Gorman and Reed and Republican Senator Root, 
might succeed in "killing the bill." Secretary McAdoo had in-
formed him that opposition leaders in the Senate had planned a 
filibuster and thus prevent passage of the bill.20 The opposition 
was 1ntluent1al enough to bring about a party break in the 
Senate.21 
"Quiet tips" were given to balky Senators, to visit the 
White House. It was understood that the President's patience 
had been exhausted, for the New York Tribune, ot September 27, 
------
1913 stated, 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22 • 
"He tears that unleae he wields the master'• 
rod the opposition to the currency bill will 
assume dangerous proport1ows, aa ••• 1ntluences 
are at work to upaet the adm1n1atrat1on•a pro• 
gramme •• Patronage is the rod which the President 
will undoubtedly use on the trio whom he believes 
are liable to cauae the most disturbance.•22 
Laughlin, P• 169. 
Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, (Doubleday, 
Page and oo.) (Garden City, N, Y., -ygm_rpp. -n'6-89. 
Henry J. Ford, Woodrow Wilson, The Man and His Work, (D. 
Appleton and Co., 'I. Y. 191~Y p~oe.- - - -
.!!.! York Tribune, Sept. 27 1 1913. 
r 
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Senator Hitchcock would not change hia attitude because he 
telt that he had nothing to lose through hie defiance of the 
president, since Secretary Bryan controlled the patronage in 
Nebraska, and since be himself had been elected to Congress by 
both Republican and Democratic views. From the first he bad made 
1t clear that be was not in accord with President W1laon•a cur-
rency v1ewa. 23 
There were many persons who requested hearings betore the 
Senate Banking and Currency Committee regarding the adm1n1atra-
t1on• s bill, ao, further action was delayed to permit these hear-
ings. Among those heard were: bankers; business men who bad ex-
perienced hardship in 1907, in obtaining currency trom the banks 
even though they had plenty of collateral; and members of 
Chambers of Commerce. Th.ere were individuals aa: R. c. Milliken, 
Monetary Statiat Bond Bldg. Wash. D. c., who spoke on defects and 
advantages ot the bill; Jer1m1ah w. Jenke, Prof. ot Government, 
New York Un1vera1't7 1 who thought the bill good and, that it would 
decidedly improve the ex1at1ng defective banking system; Victor 
Moraweta, a New York lawyer who specialized in corporation and 
banking law, and who considered the bill detective; and B. Parker 
Willia, Prof. or Economioa and writer of financial art1olea, who 
was expert advisor to the House Banking and Currency Committee 
23. New York Tribune, Sept. 301 1913. 
-----
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under Carter Glaas•s chairmanship. 24 
When the Senate finally passed the bill 54--34, on December 
19, 1913, with three Republicans voting for it, its form had chan-
ged from that upon which the House had passed. Thia necessitate~ 
sending both bills to a oon.t'erence ot the two Houses. The con-
ference was composed or nine Senate conferees and Representative~ 
Glass, Korbley ot Indiana, and Hayes ot California. When 
favorable action was secured, the bill was signed by President 
25 Wilaon on December 23, 1913. Thus tar this was the most im-
portant piece ot legislation ot the Wilson administration. The 
problem, now, was to get the new law into operation.26 
The Act as approved waa, "An Act to provide tor tbe eatabllsh-
ment of Federal reserve banks, to turniah an elastic currency, to 
attord means ot red1acount1ng commercial pape~, to establish a 
more effective supervision or banking in the United States, and 
tor other purposes.•27 Section 10 spec1t1ed the qual1f1cat1ona 
of members of the Federal Reserve Board. This board consists ot 
seven members appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent or the Senate. After the anactment or the Banking Act ot 
1935, the terms or the appointees were changed.28 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
Hearings Before the Committee on Banlc1§§ and Currency u. s. 
Senate 63 Co~. l.sesa. Vol. !':" PP• 13-2522. -
New York Trlline, Dec. 21, 1913 and Dec. 23, 1913. See also 
ti\ignI!ii, P• 169. 
Outlook, (Mar. 7, l914)Vol. 106. P• 527. 
Federal Reserve Act, Gov•t Print. Office, Wash. 1935. P• l. 
ll'ederal Reserve Act, P• 35. 
The appointment of the Reserve Board showed evidence ot the 
1poils system, tor, of the five appointed to serve with the 
secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency, 
some knew little of banking, but they did represent some interest 
group, 1.e., labor or tarmer.29 In April, this committee an-
nounced the twelve reserve cities, provided tor in the Act, as 
being Boston, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Richmond, Kansas 
City, Atlanta, St. Louis; M1nneapol1a 1 Dallas, Texas, Cleveland, 
and San Francisco. They gave as the basis ot their aelectiona, 
" •••• the ability of banka 1n a given d1atr1ct to subscribe the 
necessary capital for their regional. bankJ the mercantile·, in-
dustrial and financial connections existing in each district; and 
the probable usefulness ot a regional bank to serve a district ••• 
their general geographic situation, the population, area and 
prevalent business act1v1t1ea of the diatrict."30 
Being or the opinion that there was widespread ignorance 
among the voters or the country as to the dangers or the country•a 
financial system; Edwin w. Kemmerer in hia A.B.c ~ ~ Federal 
Reserve System, states, 
29. Laughlin, P• 142. 
30. !!!!, Nation, Vol. 98, P• 383. 
"In 1912 the United States had many times 
more commercial banka than any other country 
in the world ••• The great majority ot national 
banks were national in nothing but name. In 
1907 our supply or reserve money was large. 
We had at that time in the United States the 
largest supply of gold 1n the world. It waa 
inettective, however, because it waa widely 
aoatteredJ hence euspene1on ot cash payments 
throughout the country, currency premium., the 
breakdown ot our domestic exchanges, the il-
legal issue ot million• or dollars ot mon97 
substitutes, and all other disgraceful accom• 
panments or the old time American panic •••• 
These then were the three moat serious phaaea 
or our banking decentral1&$.t1ona (l) Absence 
or a responsible national conaervator ot the 
money market, like the Bank ot France or the 
Bank ot England. (2) Scattered bank reserves. 
(3) Immobile bank reservea.•~I 
40. 
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System 
thousands of banks held their own gold reserves. blit after ita 
establishment, member banks turned their gold reserves over to 
the control of the Federal Reserve Bank• and under the control or 
the Federal Reserve Board a •vast central pool or credit" we.a 
created.32 
Great credit goes to President Wilaon, who, though not a 
financier, realized the need for and the importance of the reform 
made possible by the Federal Reserve Act, which was the moat 
notable achievement ot his first term as Preaident.33 Ria 
31. 
32. 
33. 
Edwin w. Xemmerer, The A·B•C ot the Federal Reserve Syatem1 
Princeton Univ. Preii":" !928. pretaoe. 
Congressional Record, 71 Cong. 3. Seas., 1931. 6886. 
Edvard R. Liwis, X. H1sto1l or Aliierloan Political Tho~t 
From the Civil War to the orid War, lacm111an Co., N. · • 
rm.p. 35S. - - - -
41. 
patience and persistence are commendable, for without these 
attributes, he could not, in the face of such bitter opposition 
34 )lave engineered the passage of the bill. Credit likewise must 
be given the Monetary Commission, tor even though their project 
failed, they aroused public opinion to the extent that the finan-
cial world at least waa more open-minded when the Glaaa-Owen Bill 
was to be considered. More credit la due Representative Glass ot 
Virginia, and senator Owen ot Oklahoma, the aponeora of the bill 
in their respective Houses of Congress. 
The attitude ot the bankers only served to cryatalize public 
opinion. When bankers tought the bill because it denied private 
control, the public looked upon it with favor. True, there were 
exceptions in the banking group. Senator Weeks of Massachusetts 
was such. Although a Republican and a banker, he advocated the 
bill and voted for 1t.35 
Whether the bill served the purpose tor which it was 
designed, remains to be aaoerta1ned. We shall have evel'J' oppor-
tun1 t1 to do ao when we are confronted with the conditions which 
accompany the depreaeion of 1929•33. 
35. 
William Allen White, Woodrow Wilson the Man Bia limes and 
His Work, (Houghton Mittlln co., IJOeton,'""'!0'2ijpp §94-5:--see 
aiao"""!iiirr Jones Ford, PP• 200-0SJ Joseph P. Tumulty, PP• 466• 
489; H. Wilson Barria, President Wilson Ria Problems and His 
Pol107, Head1'y Bros. Lta., tondon, 19!,.r-pp. 1o5-o7.--- ---
Cfu£1ook, Vol. 106. P• 2. 
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CHAPTER V. 
THE DEPRESSION OF 1929 
It was pointed out bJ Frederic A. Delano, in the December 
1932 Review !l.! Rev1ewa 1 that put pan1ca have been the result ot 
overspending or as one might •&7• the result ot "speculating on 
prospective protita." The panic ot 1929 had a similar origin. 
For eight years, tollowing the war, ~ had been 1nduatr1ally ao• 
ti ve. W1 th increasing prot1 ta,.., peopl.,.# who were ordinarily oon-
aervat1 ve, lost their sense ot perspect1v'1f despite the faot,.. 
that sensible peraone should have known the upward swing could not 
Qontinue 1nde.f1n1tel7 •1 It was the English viewpoint tha~ not 
only was speculation rampant, but, aa one writer tersely put it, 
"purchases of cara, radio sets, gramophones, furniture, and even 
clothing and holida1s on the 1natallm.ent ayatem bad become exoea-
2 
a1v••" Still another Britisher compared the body politic with 
the human bodJ• He conveyed the idea that just aa a maJa::V att&oka 
each ot us 1n our weakest place, so 1t waa that the attack upon 
our "top-heavy structure ot speculation" in 1929 was 1nev1table.3 
l. Frederic A. 
of Reviews, 
Vol. 86. P• 
2. The Tablet, 
P:-570. 
Delano, "Our recent Cr1a1a and the Future",Review 
Review of Reviewa Corporation, N.Y., (Dec. 1932) 
27. 
The Tablet Office, London, (Nov. 21 1929) Vol. 154 
~. N Orm.an Crump, "The 
Centuif and After, 
Vo!. z-;-p. 4o7. 
American Banking Crisis", The Nineteenth 
Constable and co. Ltd., London, (Jan. 1933) 
42. 
The United States, according to his view, waa not a completely 
developed nor a completely settled country. Thus, there waa 
great possibility for speculation in real estate. Under pressure 
many bankers granted loana against real estate as collateral. 
so, he said, "thus when the or1a1s came the vast majority of 
bankers had one foot deeply buried in the stock market and the 
other in the fortunes •••• ot their particular localities."4 
When the World War began, the United States waa a debtor 
nation, but when 1t ended she was a creditor. Aa such, she had 
entered a moat remarkable speculative era, one, "which dwarfed 
all others, not only in duration, but also in volume and aoope.• 
Having amaaaed nearly one•half of the monetal'J' gold of the world, 
she was in no way subjected to the trying economic adjustments 
suffered by the European Nations, while effecting some aemblenoe 
ot atab111ty.5 
The disorganized trade and induatl'J' ot those nations served 
to further and favorably stimulate those ot the United States. 
Her profits 1nereaaed year by year, until they aurpaaaed all 
previous ones. This, then, served to accelerate the speculative 
movement on the New York Stock Exchange, a speculative frenzy 
which waa carried too tar, tor the gambling fever had gripped 
all classes or the populace. The Federal Reserve Board felt 
4. The Nineteenth Cent!!ff and After, Vol. 113. P• 412. 
5. lffii Liv!~ lii, 'l'he ving Age Co., N.Y., (Dec. 1929) Vol.337 
P:-3~4. ~e""&rao Bernhard Ostrolenk, 9 Why the Banka Collapsed~ 
Current History;, N. Y. Times Co.,N.Y., (May 1933) Vol.38.p.152 
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that in some way the fever must be checked, but it teared in-
curring disfavor of the public, it it took any drastic steps. 
so, tor political reasons, it was content merely to issue warn-
6 ings. 
Aoeor-dl:ng;.o. .. war-butt4s- the Federal Reserve Board published a 
1 tatement on February 7, 1929, warning the people ot the dangers 
involved in the use ot the credit supply ot the nation tor apecu-
lati ve purpoaes.7 On April 12, 1929 another warning waa ieaued 
with the result that "the diac1ples ot the gospel ot the new era 
were ••• reeenttul ot the meddling eight men at Waahington ••• •8 
There were others, however, who relt that the Board had not 
meddled enough. But, Warburg•s opinion was that though credit 
ahould be given the Board tor its warninga, the Board should have 
gone farther and "should have driven the people ashore before the 
ice broke.•9 
In Joseph Stagg Lawrence, Wall ~· .!!'!..'! Washiggton, is a 
atatement that the Board was requested to give to the Senate an7 
information and suggestions that it felt would correct the evil 
•h!ch the Federal Reserve Board had mentioned in press dis-
patches that, •money is being drawn t~om the channels of bulJ1-
nese and used tor speculative purposes and eome ot said 
6. The Living A~o' Vol. 377. PP• 394-5. 
7. Warburg, P• 6. See also Thomae B. Gammock, "Scolding b7 the 
· Federal Reserve," OUtlook, (Feb. 201 1929)Vol.l51.p. 306Jirv1ng 
. F1sher,The Stock Mariit Craah and After, (Macmillan Co. 1930}, 
p. 265.--- ---
:· Warburg! P• 508. l 1 191~. I t>l~e 
~ 
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1peculation is illegitimate and harmtuJ. ••• nlO 
During the wave ot pseudo prosperity, bank deposits contin· 
ued to increase, and bankers soon became cognizant or the fact 
that they could become the cuatodiana ot immense sum.a, simply by 
offering higher interest rates for time deposits. 
"In theory, time deposits were investments rather 
than oommero1al tunda, beoauae the7 were not active 
accounts and were not expected to be withdrawn 
readily. In practice, however, time depoeita 1n com• 
merc!al bank1 differed little from demand deposits, 
because banks, instead or ina1at1ng upon any period 
ot notice tor withdrawals, paid the deposits upon 
demand.nll 
So it was that trom 1921 to 1929 the commercial banks bad a con-
stant supply or tunda for investment purposes. Banks then became 
involved in the "issue- purchase, sale and holding or stocka.•12 
The large New York banka opened or created special security at• 
filiatea for this purpose.13 The Reserve Banka1 too; were not 
without guilt, tor they, indirectly, through making money easily 
obtainable, ~ad aided apeculat1on.1' The result was that the 
Federal Reserve Board was soon compelled to interfere, to prevent 
auoh uae of capital which was intended tor the use ot industry. 
Bueineaa men, bankera and government otf1o1ala aided with the 
10. 
ll. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Joseph Stagg Lawrence, Wall St. and Washington, (Princeton 
Univ. Presa. 1929) PP• ~2;-"'46!=!. 
Current Hiatorz, Vol. 38 P• 153. 
The Nineteenth Centurz and After, Vol. 113. P• 411. 
'Clirrent HlatoRl, Vol. 3~p. 153. 
The NineEient centurr ~ After, Vol. 113, P• 412. 
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soard's views regarding the existing danger.15 
Warnings were not heeded and the general speculative move-
~ent was suddenly climaxed by the crash or the stock market in 
October, 1929. Ordinary people were not the only surprised onts, 
tor even the moat influential economists had l>ein -of the ~pinion 
that America was on the -M0gh road to plent)-, and that poverty had 
been conquered. In ~ Spectator, Mr. s. K. Ratcliffe·, a 
Britisher, speaks ot President Hoover as being the head of this 
school or thought. Therefore, in keeping with this doctrine, the 
President was persistent in h1a atatementa that an upward turn 
would soon come.16 
Then began the incomparable period of depression, which waa 
to affect the industrial, commercial, and agricultural life ot 
the nation. With this was to come the usual bank failures, 
restricted currency, and non-payment, plus the added factors ot 
17 general alarm and lack ot assurance. 
We shall pause here to consider the crash and 1ts effect 
upon the nation. Said The New York Times, "Amid scenes ot wild 
------
confusion and drastically lower prices, the stock market con-
tinued yesterday to pay the piper tor its long dance •••• n18 
15. Alexander D. Noyes, "The stock Market Panic," Current Bisto17, (Dec. 1929) Vol. 31, P• 619. See also Warburg, P• Sos. 
16. S.K. Ratcliffe, nHow America Sees Berselt,n The Spectator, (May 28, 1932) Vol. 148. P• 754. ~ 
17. Bruce, American Parties and Politics, PP• 172-3 
18. The New York Times, Oct.~, 1929. 
-------
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Brokers, resembling a disheveled mob, exhausted both mentally and 
phya1oally, with unoertain steps reached their offices at the 
close or "one ot the most nerve wracking days in the hietorr ot 
19 the present speculative generation." 
Thousands ot stockholders threw their shares on the market 
in an attempt to salvage what they could• thereby' causing a great 
20 decline in stock prices. The toundationa of the market were 
shaken, tor never had Wall Street been eo unexpectedly forced to 
liquidate such large brokerage ac~ounta.21 
In Ohicago•s market, too, a wave or liquidation waa created 
by crowd impul•••22 Chicago and Wew York bankers went to the 
rescue of their customers, by turn1sh1ng millions of dollar• to 
break the downward course ot the market. In the Chicyo Daily 
Tribune, a newa item by William Shinnick atatea, 
· "Chicagoans took their losae·s in yesterday' a 
stock market battle like soldiera •••• There waa 
none of the loud moaning or weeping that are 
sometimes assumed to go with financial criaea. 
At least it there was any, it was done 1n places 
where the world couldn't hear. But the tension 
was there ••• The i•neral attitude was one ot 
bewilderm.ent •••• n23 
There was an unusual amount or excitement around the bro• 
kerage houaes in London. Thay remained open after the regular 
19. Chicaso ~a1~:r Tribune, Oct. 22, 1929. 
20. The New or Times, Oct. 24, 1929. Also New York Herald 
'l'rI'bune,~. 24, 1929. 
21. London Tim••• Oct. 25, 1929 
22. !he Cliic~o Da~lI .!!!!.• Oot. 24, 1929. 
23. CE!'cyo llz r bune, Oct. 25, 1929. 
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closing hour, even though they expressed the view that they did 
not fear a money tieup, such as accompanied the panics of 1893 
and 1907. 24 
In Berlin, it seemed that the break in the New York market 
was expected; and the French journals, weekly and semi•monthly, 
as well as the daily press, gave their explanations or the various 
Wall Street criaia. So it waa appropriately said, "The elegant 
Par1e1an ladJ', the English working man, the German bourgeois are 
all interested for various reaaona 1n a financial crash aome 
three thousand miles awa7 ••••• 25 
There came demands trom. Senatore at Washington, tor an in• 
veatigation, not only ot Wall Street and the factors contributing 
26 to the crash, but ot the Federal Reserve System. aa well. On 
Saturday October 26, 19291 President Herbert Hoover issued a re-
assuring statement, saying that business was sound; that leading 
bankers and 1ndustr1al1ata claimed the country was tinanoially 
27 
soundJ and that ~steria seemed momentarily to have passed. 
On the preceding day, at Washington. lobby investigations, 
the naval conference, and the taritf question were all put aside, 
24. Ibid.· 
25. tril"n~ Agi, Vol. 337, P• 509.Also !!!!. Ch1C!i$0 Daill !!.!!!.· 
l5ot. 5, 929. 
26. New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 25, 1929. 
27. '5i wew-York !lmea, Oct. 26, 1929. Also Chicago Herald 
!xamlner-;-<rCt. 26, 1929. 
10 that the drama ot Wall Street and 1ta country wide repercus-
sions might be observed. Periodicall7, Andrew Mellon, Secretary 
of the Treasury-, kept in touch b7 telegraph, with Wall Street Sen-
ator Carter Glaaa, form.er Secretary of the Treasury, blamed 
"M1tchell1am" and improper administration or the Feder~l Reaerv~ 
system tor the debacle. "K1tohell1am" was hia way of referring 
to the influence ot Charles E. Mitchell, chairman of the National 
28 City Bank of Rew York. Bia th•o1'1 waa that speculation enriches 
the speculator and thereby enr1chea the 1nduatr1al1at, and as it 
creates wealth it is a social benet1t, tor with this wealth comea 
the ability to acquire cars, homea, and personal adornment. 29 
Then came criticism.a trom other Senators, who estimated that 
Federal Reserve funds had been ueed in the speculative marlmt.30 
Representative Louis McFadden, chairman ot the House Committee on 
Banking and CUrrenoy 1 claimed that the Wall Street decline waa due 
to the Federal Reserve policy ot withdrawing gold to aid in 
31 Europe•s rehabilitation. 
Blam.1ng President Hoover and Secret&l"J' ot the Treasury 
Mellon, Senator Joseph 'l. Robinson, Democrat ot Arkansas,- and 
m1nor1t7 leader or the Senate, made the statement, 
28. New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 25, 1929. 
29. l!'im.ard Pq, Roosevelt and Ria America, (Little Brown and Co. 
Boston, 19~. P. 137. - - · 
~~: !gf4:ork Herald Tribune, Oct. 25, 1929. 
"While prices of stocks were soaring when 
speculation was at its height, no one in 
authority stood in the way or res1ated 
the movement--a movement which clearly tore-
shadowed di1aater ••• It may be well to trace 
the beginning of thi• calamity ••• Rad the 
Democratic party been 1n power when the 
stampede on the stock exchange occurred, 
the ruinous results would have been charged, 
by Republican leaders, to the t1Dlllo1al 
polioiea ot the ad.m1n1atrat1on.•32 
50. 
Returning to the scene ot action, Wall Street, there 
thronged those who wiah to tell everyone ot their loaaea; but no 
one wished to hear. They were only a part ot the great multitude 
of American citizens or every class ot society, who had con-
sidered it smart to ait around brokerage ottioes on the trail ot 
"easy money". To them this had been preferable to the moderate 
33 
earnings gained from physical labor. 
In England tbe opinion was expressed that America should wel• 
come this check to her speculative mania, and a chance to return 
to normal. True, there had been maJlT criaea in England, but 
' 
never a pure gamblini criaia ot the magnitude ot that which 
34 ' 
gripped America. 
With the atock market crash, oame a period ot depreaeion, 
during which time, some or the larger cit7 ban.kB, aa well ae 
man7 amaller country 1nat1tut1ona, failed. 35 First to cloee its 
doors, in December 1930 was the Bank of the United States, in 
Chicago ~ai'y Tribune, Oct. 31, 1929. 
!he New or Times, 5ct. 30, 1929. 
tri'i~~e, Vol. 3371 P• 395. ~radtor , P• 432. 
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1e• York City. Inveat1$Ation dlaolosed that traud and mia-
Jll8llagement had brought about its failure. Public confidence was 
! _" ,! 
shaken, and the wave or deposit withdrawals ga-tb.ere-4---imp&tus. 
36 501 in 1931, 2298 bank suspensions were recorded. 
As stated prev1ouely, it became known that the Federal Re-
serve funds had been used to a great extent, in the promotion or 
speculation, even though such use was contrary to law.37 In 
John M. Dagier'e article, "The Challenge to the Banke," World's 
work, Oct. 1931, we find that President Hoover felt that the 
-
Federal Reserve System had not been autt1o1ent to prevent the 
wrongful uae of capital and bank depoaita.38 But, said Mr. 
Carter Glass, chairman ot the Senate probe conm.tittee, "It took 
the disaster ot 1907 to get us the Federal Reserve banking 
system; the disaster ot 1928·29 ough~ to get us somewhere in 
tt 89 improvement of the s1atem. 
The first attempt to relieve the tense situation was the 
organization ot the National Credit Corporat1o~in October 1931. 
According to President Hoover's suggestion, the banks in each 
Federal Reserve district formed aasoo1ationsJ and each ot these 
established a loan committee. Then, it a bank needed tunde, it 
applied to its group committee which approved and granted th• 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
Bradford, P• 449. 
North American Review, Vol. 229, P• 174. 
3ohri M. ~a61er, Rfbe Challenge to the Banke", 
(Oct. 1931) Vol. 60, P• 41. 
Ibid, P• 43. 
-
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loan, if the collateral presented was aatiatactol'J".40 Thia cor-
poration did not prove to be the success that had been antlo1pa-
ted, and it was tollowed by the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion Act ot Janual'J" 22, 1932, which provided tor an organization 
to relieve diatreaaed banka, busineaa, agriculture and railroads. 
It began operations on February 2 1 1932 with a capital ot 
$5 1 000 1 0001 000 subscribed by, the. United States Treasury. 
Through its aid, the number of bank failures decreased in March 
41 1932 to the lowest figure since October 1929. 
Congress had stipulated that the corporation waa to be a 
bipartisan agency, to whose board not more than four members ot 
the seven appointed, oould be ot one political party. The board, 
as originated, consisted ot tour Republicans and three Demoorata. 
The original members were: Andrew Mellon, Secretary or the 
Treasur,, who waa soon succeeded. by) Ogden M1llaJ Eugene Meyer, 
governor of the Federal Reserve BoardJ Paul Bestor·, Farm Loan 
Comm1as1onerJ and General Charles G. Dawes, Republicans. The 
Democrats were: Harvey Couch, of AlabamaJ Wilson MoCartbT, ot 
Utah; and Jesse He Jones. Upon request of President Hoover, 
Mr. John Nance Garner, the speaker of the House of Representatives; 
Senator Jospeh T. Robinson, the minority leader in the Senate; 
40. Bradford, P• 451. 
41. Bradford, P• 451. 
and Senator Carter Glass, submitted names rrom which the Demo-
. 42 
cratic members or the board were chosen. 
The policies or the corporation were largel7 determined b7' 
43 President Hoover. With the creation or the R. F. c. it was 
stipulated that quarterl7 reports were to be made to Congresb re• 
garding the total amount lent the various class•• ot borrowera. 
It waa not required that the names or the borrowers, nor the 
amount lent to each, be made public. Thia brought forth the 
accusation that certain 1ntereata could be favored. Therefore 
the law was amended, requiring a report, showing the names or the 
borrowers, the amount borrowed, and the rate ot interest obarged, 
to be aent monthly to the Prea!dent; Senate and House of Repre-
aentativee. 44 It waa teared, however, that goaaipera might 
spread 1ntorm.at1on aa to who the borrowers were, and therebJ make 
deposit·ore distrustful of those 1nstitut1ona. Such would be 
disastrous in view of the taot that there was alread'J' too much 
hoarding and conaequent bank failures. 45 Already the hoarding 
movement had brought forth an appeal t:rom the Preaident that aa a 
•patriotic move toward loosening credit and restoring economic 
stabilityn hoarding should oeaae. In such a way, all citizens 
46 
might a1d the war against dep:reaaion. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
Jesse H. Jonea, "Billions Out and Billions Back" The Satur-1171v:z:1~ !2!!• The Curtis Pub. co. ,Ph1ladelphla-;-('"J\Dil 12, 
The Saturd.az: ~veniB13 !.2.!!.1 (June 12, 1937) P• 7. 
lbl'd., P• 38. 
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Mostot us are aware, however, that during a depreas1on, 
people almost always tear that the bank which holds their aavinga 
may not be aolvent; and as Paul Douglas said 1n Collapse .2£ Cycle, 
"they feel happier with their mone11n their pockets."47 It anJ 
confidence had remained, it waa soon lost when disclosures were 
made regarding the unwise practices ot man1 prominent bankers. 
Meanwhile, there waa in the making a credit expansion bill, 
which was to become known as the Glaaa-Steagall Bill. On 
February 1 1 1932, Senator Glaaa told the Senate that bank.era were 
propagandizing againat his bill, juat as they had. when the 
Federal Reserve legislation had been proposed years before. Some 
persons who admitted a lack ot knowledge aa to lta contents and 
purposes, were, at their bankers' requests, sending telegrams to 
their Senators; asking them to oppose the bill. It was even 
predicted bT a Republican Senator that the section which would 
restrict the loans of the Federal Reserve banka tor speculative 
purposes, would not be cona1dered.'8 
There were favorable reports on the Glass-Steagall bill in 
the Banking Committees of both Senate and House. Since the bill 
was designed to "gear the machiner,y of the Federal Reserve 
system tor greater service to the nation during the buaineae 
47. Paul H. Douglas, Collapse .2!:. gzcle, (Lakeside Preas. Chicago, 
Ill., 1933) Pt 8. 
48. The New York Times, Feb. 2, 1932. 
------
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emergenc7", the committees made alight amendments which would 
make it possible tor the smaller tinano1al 1nat1tut1ona ot the 
country to receive aid from the central banking ayatem.'9 About 
this time, Secretary of the Treasury, Ogden Milla, atated, 
"~here bas been a ver1 real fear that haa 
gripped the people ot the United States, 
and it haa necessarily had a paralyzing 1n-
tluence on the credit machinery of the 
country--the tear on the part ot those de-
e1r1ng credit that they might not be able 
to get itJ the rear or thoae in debt that 
their loans might be calledJ the tear ot 
the great credit claaa known aa depositors, 
that they might not in all cases be able to 
withdraw their depoaita, and ••• the fear of 
the bankers who are the trustees tor the de-
posi tora that under these outside pressures 
their institutions might be threatened.•5 0 
Senator Glass was to present the bill to the Senate on 
Monday, whereas Representative Steagall, its co-author, was to do 
likewise. in the House. Because of the nature and purpose ot the 
measure, the House put aside all other business and, after a 
three hour debate, passed the bill with a vote of 350 to 15. 
Even though there had been charges ot •gag rule and no time to 
study the bill", many ot 1ta cr1tica had voted in favor of it.51 
49. 
50. 
51. 
When he introduced hia bill, Mr. Steagall said of its pro-
The New York Tjm;b' Feb. 3, 1932. 
Bei'r!iiis"Be?ore e Committees on Banking and Currenu~ 
House of Regreseiititlves, 72 Cong. I. Seaa:-On R.R. ~03 (Feb. ~. 1 32) u. s. Gov•t. Print. Ottioe, Wash., 1932, 
The New York Times, Feb. 16, 1932. 
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visions, 
"These are not cure-alls •••• but I do believe they 
will extend the service of the Federal Reserve 
System and bring that great agency into the tull 
par~ it waa intended from the start to take in the 
credit machinery and banking system of this countr,.. 
Our banking ayatem baa drifted into unhappy days. 
Some ot us for years have warned the country ot what 
was taking place and have pleaded with those in 
power to change the policies under which we were 
operating. Now a much larger task oonfronta us aa a 
reault of the vicious practices which apparently 
were condoned bi 8§<>•• ~espona1ble for the Federal 
Reserve System. . 
56. 
In the Senate, the bill was not takea up until the following 
day. It was then that Senator Glass spoke in its defense. He 
emphasized the fact that the purpose ot the bill was to "make 
credit reaevoira ot the Federal Reserve System more accessible to 
small banks"• It was pointed out that banks, in groups ot five, 
could pool their time or demand prom1aaory notea, provided they 
\were backed by adequate secur1 ty, and then borrow directly from 
the Reserve banka.53 In detenae of the Federal Reserve System 
itself, Senator Glaaa ea1d that there had been 1nnuendoea that 
the Federal Reserve System had broken down. These charges he 
considered untrue. If there were a breakdown 1t was not in the 
system, but in the banking comm.unity of the United States, where 
member banks of the Federal Reserve had ceased to tunotion.54 
52. The New York Times, Feb. 16, 1932. 
53. nird:- -
54. '1ii""New York Times. Feb. 171 1932. 
-------
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It became known that the bank• wh1oh were members ot the 
pederal Reserve in New York, telt his accusation unjust. They 
said nothing in retutat1on of th1a statement, however, tor the7 
were anxious that the bill be paaaed. 55 
At still another time, when Senator Sh!pstead, ot Minne-
sota, expressed doubt ot the bill's passage, in face ot bankers' 
opposition, Senator Glass stated that he was unwilling to even 
think that the congress ot the United States would let certain 
ot the Qount17ta bankers draft legislation for 1t.56 Senator 
Connally or Texas let it be known that he hoped there would be 
no further dela7 in paaaing the bill which would give the coun-
try, •this real piece ot legislation•; wl:d.oh was to hie mind the 
onl7 "hopeful light• in all that ~d been considered b7 the 
Senate at that aeaaion.57 So, with but little oppoa1t1on, the 
bill was passed in the Senate. Naught was needed now but the 
President's signature. and that waa expected to be obtained soon 
therearter.58 
The Glass-Steagall Bill was next aent to President Hoover. 
With the affixing of his signature, it became a law on Februarr 
27, 1932.59 
55.. Ibid·. 
56. Congressional Record, 72 Cong. l, Seaa. Vol. 75, part 4. 
57. Ibid. 1 P• 4330. 
58. Tlii"llew York Times, Feb. 20, 1932. 
59. ~be Peaeral Reserve Bulletin, (Mar. 1932) P• 141. Also 
Bradford, P• 343. 
se. 
With the enactment ot this amendment to the Federal Reserve 
Aet, it was hoped, once more, tbat a panacea tor the banking ill• 
ot the nation had been round. For the time being we will leave 
that as a matter ot conjecture. Strange aa it ma7 seem, there 
appeared in !2!, !!:! ~Times, ot March 20, 1932, an article 
stating that three weeks had passed since the signing or the b11~ 
during which time, it was ascertained trom the weekly reports ot 
the Federal Reserve System, that none ot the privileges, which 
might be gained from its enactment, had 7et been exercised. 
Nevertheless, the measure must have had some psychological value, 
for there was a drop in the number ot bank failures and a reato~a­
t1on of confidence, through the mere knowledge ot the tact, that 
the banks could obtain aid it such were needed. 60 
Taking a hurried glance at the foregoing, before passing on 
to our neat event1 the 7ear 1929 had a good start. Signas of 
prosperit7 were ever;ywhere. Induetry we.a at its peak. Luxuriee 
were, to a given extent, enjo7ed by moat of the vast population. 
Bank deposits were mounting and apeoulation waa rampant. With-
out a warning the bubble burst, when on October 19, 1929, the 
disastrous crash or the Wall Street market sent a tremor ot un-
easiness .over the count~. 61 
so. The New York Ti.mes, Mar. 20, 1932. 
61. Bernir! fa7• looaevelt ~ !!!!. A.zmrica, P• 94. 
59. 
To use the word.a or Mr. Roosevelt, in his acceptance speech 
of July 2, 1932, when he spoke ot the aftermath ot the great ex-
pansion and "delirious speculation" which had gone on before the 
crash, "men lost their jobs ••• banka became frightened and started 
calling loans •• ~Thoae who had money were atra1d to part with 
it.n62 
Then came the usual reaction: dwi~dling confidence 1n banks; . 
withdrawalsJ hoarding; remedial legislation to coax ourrenc1 
rrom hiding, to restore faith in banking 1nst1tut1ona, and it 
possible avert further disaster. So we found the enactment or 
the Glass-Steagall Bill which it wa• hoped would make more satis• 
factory the .t'unctiona of the Federal Reserve System, which 1taelt 
was the outcome ot legislation intended to avert a recurrence or 
oondi~lons, such aa were experienced 1n 1907. 
62. Cone;r:essional Digest, (Aug.-Sept. 1932) Vol. 11, P• 209. 
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S1gna ot weakening••Peartul depoa1tora-· 
Bank runa and oollapaea--Emergeno7 Bank• 
1ng Lawa and President P.D.Rooaevelt, 
1933•-The new Glaaa•Steagall Bill or the 
Banking Act ot 1938. 
CHAPTER VI. 
INSTABILIT!' OF BANKING 
Albert Shaw, editor ot Review ~ Rev1ews1 once made the 
statement, th.at much ot the woe and m1ae17 experienced in the 
United Statea, from its beginning to the present day, bad been 
due to banka. .Most countries; regardless of their a1ze, he 
claimed; had some aort ot banking ayatem: but the United Statea 
had "just banka and more bank•"•l He went on to aq that due to 
the lack ot uniformity 1n the banking lawa ot the various States, 
supervision or inspection; in many instances, was ve'l"f lax. The 
breath-taking activities ot certain banketta in Wall Street had 
been emulated in aouthern and western o1t1ea, but onl7 on a 
2 lesser· scale• 
When the year 1933 opened, we found Oongresa 1n a contused 
state. It seemed that no one had power. Lippmann gives ua the 
impression that.President Hoover apparently had no influence upon 
the Congresa1onal boc.11'; and President-elect Roosevelt, aa yet had 
3 
no authority. Bernard F&'I leavea a •lightly d1tterent 1mpreaaion, 
by intimating that it wae evident that on the ev-e of hi• retire-
ment Preeident Hoover was unwilling to assume respona1bil1t1ea 
l. Review ot Reviews and World Work, (Jan. 1934) Vol.90, P• 46.ed. 
2. fo1a.· - - -
3. Walter Lippmann, Interpretation• 1933-1935, Macmillan co., 
B.Y., 1936, PP• 1-5. eo. --- ----
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which might hamper the new executiveJ and the latter felt unwill-
ing to offer support until legall7 entitled to do ao.4 
In January there had been 237 bank suapenaions, but the 
seriousness or the situation had not become apparent until Feb-
ruary 14, 1933. On that date, William Comstock, Governor ot 
Michigan, declared a week's bank holida7 in that State which waa 
one or the largest and moat industrial States or the Union. 
Because of d1rf1culties which had ariaen in the city' or Detroit, 
the banking situation was so precarious, that the Governor, to 
avert too great disaster, had ordered the banks cloaed.5 
The moratorium, aside trom disturbing depositors to a great 
degree, drained cash from surrounding areas. Large Detroit cor-
porations withdrew the!~ deposits from New York as well as from 
adjoining States. These withdrawals were necessary that payroll 
requirements might be met. These neighboring bankers in turn 
withdrew balances from New York, that they too might meet their 
creditors. Thua began the movement tor the restriction or de-
posit payments in other States. The Federal Reserve Banks were 
oonstantly being called upon for additional credit, ao that local 
6 banks could meet the demands made upon them. 
On March 3, 1933, Governor Borner conterred with Chioag~ 
4. Bernard Fay, Roosevelt and His America, Little Brown and co., 
Boston, 1933. P• 52. --- ---
5. Bradfofdi P• 455. see also Faya P• 5l;Con1res11~nal iig§, (Apr. 9;:)3 1 Vol. 12, p. 98; c . v. colt and • s. e t2'l';, s, ! History ~ !!!!, Banking Cr1aia, Greenberg Pub.Co.N.Y':"l . p.6 
6. Bradford, P• 455. 
ea,. 
Cook Countr and Illinois banker• and deci~ed that no morator1Uia 
would be declared in Illinois. Almoat s1multaneousl1, however, 
government otf1o1ala at Madison, Wisconsin announced that a two 
weeks' banking holidaJ would become etfective ·1mmediate17·in tha' 
State. 7 
The incompetence of many bankers, and the disorganization ot 
our bank1ng'syatem. became even more apparent as banks throughout 
the country were forced to oloae.8 The gravity or the depreaeion 
was increased bJ' the spreading of the banktng panic to new re-
gions. Even Oongreaa was •larmed, for in Wallhington, a wave ot 
hoarding bad begun. Thia, according to Arthur Sears Henning; 
Chioaso'' Dailz Tribune commentator on political events as they 
happen in Washington; was the atmosphere at the cap~tal, to which 
President•eleot Franklin D. Roosevelt cam.e.9 
President Hoover conterred with Senator Carter Glaaa, ot 
Virginia, after failing to secure Kr. Rooaevelt•a consent to 
unite in a recommendation to Congress on the matter of guarantee 
of bank depoaita.10 Since Mr. Glaaa•a authorit1 in the field 
of banking and tinancial leg1alat1on was considered unexcelled, 
it waa felt that he, a Democrat, might be prevailed upon, to urge 
the President-elect to agree to recommend the desired legislation. 
7. Chicago Dailz Tribune, Mar. 3, 1933. 
a. lorl~Tomorrow, (Mar. 15, 1933) Vol. 16, P• 243. 
9. bhlcaso ~lir Tribune, Mar. 2, 1933. lo.the Rew or TIIA£:a, Mar. 3, 1933J London Times, Mar. 4, 1933; l'.h!. B\iii"1niii !!!..• Kar. a, 1933) P• 3. . 
Mr. 
11 
Glass, however, did not oommit himself in any way. 
63. 
Attempts were made to secure a statement trom Mr. Roosevelt, 
as to what course of action he would pursue to relieve the tense 
situation, with which he would soon be 1dent1t1ed.12 Other than 
:r1aking 1 t clear that he would act "swiftly and certainly" he let 
it be known that he would have nothing to say until after his 
inauguration; or until he had ta.ken over the reins or power.13 
Ai!eunwhile the tanking crisis was becoming more acute, and 
the hoarding fever was rising.14 Plans tor the use of scrip as 
emergency cash were being fostered in Harrisburg and \~arren, 
Pennsylvania; Nashville, Tennessee; and Jackson, Mississippi. In 
Dallas, Texas and in California, legislators too, were trying to 
work out an exchange medium.15 
In Illinois, despite the announcement of the previous day, 
Governor Horner issued a proclamation declaring a brief mora-
torium. New York agreed to do likewise. Foremost Chicago bank-
ers were of the opinion that the ~oney panic was a •national 
affair and that it should be solved by action nation-wide in 
scope.nl6 They stated that generally, Chicago banks were in 
a stronger condition than banks elsewhere, including those ot 
11. London Times, Mar. 3, 1933. 
12. cfilca~o Daily Tribune, Mar. 3, 1933; The New York Times, Mar. 
--3, 19 3. 
13. Chicago failz Tribune, Mar. 4, 1933. 
14. London T mes, Mar. 3, 1933. 
15. Chicago Dally Tribune, Mar. 4, 1933. 
16. Ibid. 
-
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rew York City. 17 
Throughout the country, there were partial and complete 
moratoria. In practically all places where there was not a com-
plete ~orator1um, deposit withdrawals were restricted. Alabama 
banks were restricted to a tive per-cent basis, as were many banks 
elsewhere.18 
Said the London Times, when reviewing the American situation, 
and speaking or the part Mr. Roosevelt would play as soon as 
inaugurated, 
"In some quarters the prediction is made 
that he will at once order an embargo on 
domestic gold withdrawals, and that, using 
the power believed to·be vested in him by 
Statute, he will place a pr't>q.ibitive tee 
on the export of gold. It ls significant 
that a number ·of leading men of his own 
party are frankly of the belief that this 
action should be taken ••• 'l'he dis·ease is des-
perate, and the remedy must be as 1mmed1ate 
•s it is potent. It is right to say that, 
whatever his private thoughts may be, noth-
ing has disturbed Ur. Roosevelt's air of se-
rene self confidence. ills courage is unques-
tioned, his willingness to make quick deoi-
eione has often enough been noted; and he will 
have instant need of both ••• A sense or relief 
that the era or twelve years of Republican 
rule has ended is part of the atmosphere, and 
if nobody quite knows what Mr. Roosevelt's 
prom~sed 0 new deal" w1ll be, the vast major-
ity are thankful that it will at least be 
something new. He will come into office with 
tremendous power, power derived from the sheer 
immensity ot his victory and fortl:fied by 
17. Chlc!SjO Daily Tribune, Mar. 4, 1933. 
18. !bid. 
the fact that he owes it not to one or 
more sections of the UnifSd States but to 
the country as a whole." 
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In London, at this time, Americans who possessed dollars 
had little monetary difficulty. In Paris, banks refused to cash 
checks on American banks which were affected by the bank holiday. 
Private banks in Rome refused the American dollar at any price 
even though there was general confidence in American banking re-
sourcea. 20 A prominent German banker voiced the opinion that the 
American crisis could easily be "surmounted" if the new leaders 
themselves remained calm, for, "the psychosis of rear ls the 
worst danger threatening a count:ry of vast resources like 
Amer!ca.•21 
On the eve of his inauguration, Mr. Roosevelt held a three 
hour d1souss1on on anti-panic problems. His advisors, those 
present at the discussion were: Jesse H. Jones and Harvey 
Couch, Democrat directors of the R~conatruction Finance Corpora-
tlon; Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, leading Democratic au-
thority on the Federal Reserve System; William H. Woodin who was 
to be Mr. Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury; Professor 
Raymond Moley an economics expert; and Senator Cordell Hull of 
19. London Times, Mar. 4, 1933. 
20. Chica&£ Dally Tribune, Mar. 5, 1933. 
21. Ibid. 
-
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Tennessee, who was to be Mr. Roosevelt's Secretary of State.22 
New York and Chicago bankers had asked that a national mora-
torium on banking be declared. President Hoover, it seemed was 
1n favor or the plan, but here again, Mr. Roosevelt would not com-
mit himself. In Washington, it was generally understood that Mr. 
Roosevelt planned to call an extraordinary session or Congress, 
to deal with the banking situation. All other problems were to 
be put aside temporarily.23 
Immediately after his inauguration, President Franklin Delan:> 
Roosevelt summoned, to an in.formal conference, his Cabinet members 
and leaders of Congress, to discuss tentative measures for bring-
ing about some means for relieving the tense banking situation.?4 
Only the day before, it had been stated in the London Times, that 
upon assuming office, the President should use his power, to ob-
tain still more power, and with such authority, reorganise the 
machinery ot the government, and obtain authority over Congress, 
"without which no programme ot action can escape abortion." It 
further stated that, such he should do immediately while the de-
pression was at its height, tearing not personal oonsequences.25 
By the latter, i~ was presumably meant, that he should ignore 
what affect it might have upon his chances in 1936 for renomina-
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
The Bua1nese Week, (Mar. 8, 1933) P• 3. Aleo Chicago Dailz 
¥r!'bune, Mar.~1933. Tne New York Times, Mar. 4, 1933. 
Brad?ord;-p:- 457. Also Chica~o Dally !,ribune, Mar. 5, 1933; 
The New York Times, Mar. 5, ~33. 
toiidon-Trmii, Mar. 4, 1933. 
tion and re-election. 
Strangely enough, in his inaugural address, the new President 
promised, "to lead his distressed countrymen out of the economic 
wilderness---by means or a dictatorship if necesaary."26 It was 
with these ideas. in mind, that he assumed office on Saturday, 
March 4 1 1933; and it waa on that morning that the American crisis 
had reached its climax, with the closing ot the New York and Illi-
27 
nois banks. The last of the forty-eight Statea to declare a 
bank holiday, was Delaware. 28 
The Sunday issue of the Chicago Dailz Tribune bore news ot 
conditions in that city. Having managed to get along without 
banks on Saturday, ways were being figured out whereby business 
might be carried on. There were in.form.al discussions regarding 
the use of Clearing House cert1f1oates, although nothing definite 
could be decided upon until some action on the matter took place 
in Washington. New York awaited the same 1ntormat1on.29 
In Washington, measures which were suggested by the Cabinet 
members to the new President, were: 
"Invocation of powers with which the wartime 
trading with the enemy act invested in the 
President, to prohibit the conversion or cur-
rency into gold. (2) Establish a corporation 
the capital ot which would be subscribed 
-'·•··-------------------------------
26. Chicago Daill Tribune, Mar. 5, 1933. 
27. London Tlmea, Mar. B, 1933. 
28. Chicago Daily Tribune, Mar. 5, 1933. 
29. Ibid. 
-
by federal reserve banks and employed to 
guarantee bank deposits. (3) Issue of 
scrip as in the panic or 1907 ••• to take 
the place of money. {4) Guarantee or bank 
deposits under a plan whereby halt the 
funds would be furnished by the federal 
government."30 
68. 
On Monday the President•s Bank Proclamation of the previoua 
evening, occupied the attention or depositors and bankers through-
out the country, as the "whole financial mechanism of the United 
Statea ••• tor the time being had ce-.aed to function." This 
proclamation.of a nation-wide banking moratorium, was looked 
upon with approval by leading bankers who felt that Clearing 
House certitioatea might be used with the aame success as in 
1907.31 
As the President'• program we.a aiming to restore public con· 
fidence, and to reetore the banking machinery, that industry 
might not suffer, people throughout the country began to adjust 
themselves rather cheertullJ to the unusual and difficult situa-
tion. Postal Savings banks, being opened tor buaineaa, received 
tremendous deposits because confidence in theae 1nat1tut1ona had 
not waned. 32 
Although Congress had not convened plans which would facili-
tate emergenc7 banking leg1alat1on in both Houses were being 
30. 
31. 
32. 
Chicago ~a1i1 Tribune, Mar. 5, 1933. 
The New or Times, iar. 6, 1933. Aleo London Time, Mar. 6, 
111!3;--a-h~o Dallz Tribune, Mar. 6, 1933. ~ 
Manoheater uardlan, LOndon, Mar. 7, 1933; Also Review ot 
Reviews, (Feb. I934) Vol. 90. p. 11. 
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worked out. A historic plan, which would bind support through 
caucus majority rule, was adopted by the Democrats 1n the Senate. 
By this method members were bound in advance to cast their votes 
"en bloc." The7 went even further, however, and agreed 50 to 3 
that the caucus could bind all members, with onl7 a slight major• 
ity. This latter agreement would not hold true in the House of 
Representatives, for there a two•thlrds majority la necessary to 
bind all members in a part7 caucua4:a~ 
At the same time; the House llemocrats were also busy working 
out an emergeno1 program which would give the Pree1:dent the 
greatest possible authority during the oriais 1 and to facilitate 
the drawing up of a "new and permanent" legislative program re• 
lat1ng to banks and banking• It is, or course, understood that 
at this time there were 1 in reality, no committees in the House, 
as such could only be elected atter Congress convenedj but those 
who would 1n all probability compose the Banking and Currency 
committee, and the House leaders who had previously conferred v4th 
the President, began to work out a program which would be ready 
for presentation as soon aa the House should be organized on 
Thursday. With this set•up in both Houses, the Democrats felt 
they had everything under control• In this way they might almost 
instantaneoual7 secure passage ot any urgent legislation, without 
33. The New York Times, Mar. 71 1933. 
---
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fear of any revolt by 1ndependents.34 They felt that at such a 
time, it was inopportune to discuss details. The essential 
matter was that the Administration should make decisions which it 
considered would be most effective, having the assurance that the 
nation would cheerfully fall in line. 35 
In New York and in Chicago, word was still awaited trom· 
Washington, whereby the banks might issue the Clearing House cer-
tificates which they had in readiness. Frank R. Elliott, presi-
dent of Chicago's Clearing House, stated, 
"The purpose of clearing house cert1t1catea is 
to manufacture an additional sound currency 
to meet the demand ••• If the banks pay out 
currency and gold the people will hoard it. 
Therefore the current need in an emergency 
like the present one is to give them a kind 
ot money that the7 won•t hoard. The clearing 
house certificates will fill this need."36 
Upon receiving notice, however, that the Government waa not 
1n favor of the uae of such acr1p, the Clearing House of ticiala 
gave up this soheme.37 
It was understood that President Roosevelt would ask Con-
gress to confirm the powers which he asaum.ed, when he proclaimed 
38 the bank holiday. On March 9 1 1933, when Congress convened, 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
The New York Times, Mar. 7, 1933. 
y;rppiiiiiin;-Iii'terpretations of 1933-1935, 
Chicago DaIS1 Tribune, Mar:-7~3~ 
IE!a. lar. , 1033. 
toiiaon Times, Mar. 9, 1933. 
P• 22. 
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the President's message_ was read. Because of its very great 1m-
portance, we quote: 
"On March 3, banking operations in the United 
States ceased ••• Suftice it to say that the Gov-
ernment has been compelled to step in for the 
protection or the depositors and the business 
of the Nation. our first task is to reopen all 
sound banks •••• I ask of the Congress the imme-
diate enactment of legislation giving to the ex-
ecutive branch or the Government control over 
banks for the protection of depositors ••• I ask 
amendments to the Federal Reserve Act to provide 
such additional currency, adequately secured, as 
it may become neoessar, to issue to meet all de-
mands for currency ••• without increasing the 
unsecured indeb!Sdness of the Government of the 
United States.n 
He then stressed the need tor immediate action to allay unwar-
ranted doubts regarding banks, and to create a new relationship 
40 between the banka and the people. 
It was in response to this urgent plea, that Congress passed 
the Emergency Eank1ng Eill• Of the four fairly distinct sets of 
provisions, the one which interests us particularly, is the tire~ 
which confirms not only the provisions of the President's proclam-
ation, but any subsequent ones which he might make regarding the 
"hoarding and export ot gold and the reopening ot the banks." 
He might require holders of gold to turn it over to the Govern-
ment in e~ehange for other currency, under penalty for failing to 
do so. Too, for the period of the emergency, he was empowered to 
39. ·· Con~reaslonal Record, ~ Cong. l. Seas. Vol. 77.part l,p.45. 
40. Ibi • 
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prevent member banks rrom carrying on any business other than 
that which might be consented to by the Treasury Departm&nt.41 
Because of the extent of power granted the President by the 
Seventy-third Congress, during its special session. the London 
Times spoke of him as a bank dictator; and stated that f'ull 
powers were given him after he had "urged upon Congress the olear 
neces$1ty for immediate action, since the continuance or strangu-
lation of banking facilities was untbinkable." 42 
Using these powers, the President extended the National 
banking holiday, ao that whatever ateps necessary might be taken 
to prepare tor the reopening or sound banks of the Federal Re-
serve System. 43 Fearing puniahment and publicity under the terms 
ot the Emergency Banking Act, hoarders or gold made haste to re-
44 turn their hoards to banka all over the country. It is said 
that in Chicago alone, "millions of dollars in gold flowed into 
the vaults of several loop banka.n45 
At a later date, in refutation or the statement of President 
Roosevelt, of March 3, 1933, that, "the mechanics of o1v111za-
t1on had come to a dead stop", Mr. Hoover made the statement, 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
"We had no bank panic from the crash of the 
boom in i,92g· ••• we had no panic at the moat 
dangerous point in the depression when our 
banks were weakest in the spring of 1932. 
There was no panic before the election ot 
1932 ••• They (the people) became scared a tew 
~eeks before the inauguration of the New Deal 
on March 4; 1933 •• because ••• people awoke to 
the fact that promises given in the campaign 
would be violated ••• Buainess slackened ita 
energies. Shrewd speculators shipped their 
money abroad at fabulous profits. Bankers 
tried to protect themselves. The public in 
blind tear demanded gold and the "covenants" 
or the United Statea which called tor gold. 
Some of them were soared at bank• by the 
destructive publication of R.F.c. loans. The 
banking structure was not insolvent. After 
the banks were closed, it was found that the 
solvent banks ••• comprised 92 per cent ot the 
banking strength of the country. The·Presi-
dent himself stated they were sound. Sub-
sequently more banks were found sound and 
reopened.•46 
73. 
It was on the evening of Sunday, March 12, 1933, that Presi-
dent Roosevelt made a radio address in which he spoke on the 
f 1na.nc1al crisis and explained the purpose of the bank hol~daya 
which his prev1otis proclamation had brought about.47 He prefaced 
his remarks with words to the effect, that this addreae was to be 
in explanation of recent Government legislation, and.. in appre-
ciation of the attitude with· which the people at large bad 
accepted the aocompaJl11ng inconveniences. 
46. 
47. 
He briefly spoke of the customary use made, by banka, of 
Herbert Hoover, American Ideals Veraua the New Deal, 
Scribner Press, N.Y. (no pub. aa£e) pp.~-44:" ----
Chicago Daily Tribune, Mar. 13, 1933. 
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deposits entru.sed to them for safe keeping, that is, putting them 
to work keeping the wheels of industry in action. Said he, 
"Because of the undermined confidence on a part 
of the public, there was a general rush by a 
large portion or our population to turn bank 
deposits into currency or gold---- a rush ao 
great that the soundest banks could not get 
enough currency to meet the demand. The reason 
for this was that on the spur of the moment it 
was ••• 1mpoas1ble to sell perfectly sound asaets 
or a bank and convert them into oaah except at 
panic prices tar below their real value. By the 
afternoon ot March 3, scarcely a bank 1n the 
country was open to do business. Proclamations 
temporarily closing them in whole or part had 
been 1aeued by the governors in almoat all the 
States. It was then that I 1aaued the proclama-
tion providing tor the nation-wide bank holiday, 
and this was the first step 1n the Government's 
reconstruction ot our financial and economic 
fabrio. 
"The second step waa the leg1slat1on ••• paased by 
the Congress cont1rm1ng my proclamation and 
broadening my power• ao that it became poeaible •• 
to extend the hol1d8.J and 11.ft the ban of that 
holiday graduallY', Thia law also gave author1t7 
to develop a program ot rehabilitation of our 
banking facilities. I want to tell our o1tizene 
in every part or the Nation that the National Con-
greaa--Republ1cana and Demoerata al1ke--ahowed by 
this action a devotion to public welfare and a 
realization or the emergency and the neeeaait7 
for ·~i3d that ia difficult to match in our his-
tory. 
He stated that during the interim, the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing was preparing the new currency which would be sent out 
to the twelve Federal Reserve banks• to~ issuance where assets 
48. ·congressional Record, 73 Con~. 1. Seas., Vol. 77~ part l. p. 
asi. See also eh!cago Da111 r!Eune, Mar. 1!, 1tr3. 
were good. Aa if in answer to the anticipated que1"1' as to why 
all banks were not to be reopened at the same time, the President 
continued, 
"Your Government does not intend that the his-
tory of the past few 1ears shall be repeated. 
We do not want and will not have another epi-
demic of bank failures. As a result we start 
tomorrow, Monday, (March 13, 1933) with the 
reopening of the banks 1n the twelve Federal 
Reserve bank cit1ea-•those which on first ex-
amination by the Tre&S\U'Y have already been 
found to be alr1ght. 8 49 -
He then mentioned the order in which other banks would re-
open, and brought out the tact that no sound bank would be a 
dollar worse oft, than it had been when 1t wa4 forced to cloae 
its doors. Further, he stressed the point that peoples' tunda 
had been handled in aome cases by either diahoneat or incompetent 
bankers who had betrayed the trust placed in them by resorting to 
speculation and in making of unwise loans. Such behavior on their 
part had weakened the confidence of the public, and therefore it 
was the work or the Government to provide a maoh1ne17 and the 
meana whereby the financial structure would regenerate public 
confidence. Such then waa the aim ot the recent leg1alat1on.50 
So it was that on Monday, March 131 1933 all sound banks in 
the twelve Federal Reserve cities reopened. Banks 1n some 250 
clearing house o1t1ea were reopened on Tuesday: while all remain• 
49. Con~ressional Record 73 Cons• 1. Sees. Vol. 77, part. l, 
P• Bl. 
so.~· 
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1ng sound banks were reopened on Wednesday. 51 This made it 
possible for the countrr to do buainess again, with the use of 
about ninety per eent of its banking resources. Depositors 
seemed to have forgotten their distrust or banking 1nst1tut1ona, 
for everywhere, deposits in the reopened banke, exceeded with-
dre.wala.52 
Depositors had accepted the word of the President, regarding 
the safety of their deposits in the reopened banks, for, says an 
editorial "A Good Start" in~ Business !.!.,!!1 of March 22, 1933, 
"The old banking ayetem received its death blow with the moratori-
um ••• Old banke may reopen under their old names, but they cannot 
be the same old banks ••• The banka are reopening now with what 
amounts to a gove:rnment guarantee. The federal government and 
various states are certifying that reopened banks are sound."53 
Many persons regarded the reopening of the banka, merely as 
the end of an exciting week, during which they had been without 
funds. To them, the crisis had passed. To those at Washington, 
and to those in the banking world, it was t~e termination of 
efforts to attain some form of rehabilitation. To them onl1 the 
greatness or the banking collapse and the need tor reform been 
51. Bradford, P• 459. Also Manchester Guardian, Mar. 11, 1933. 
52. Ibid., P• 460. 
53. The Business Week, (Mar. 22, 1933) P• 32 and (Mar. 29, 1933) p.-4. -
54 
revealed. 
77. 
There were, however, thousands of depositors who suttered 
heavy losses in banks which would not reopen. Thus the appearance 
of recovery was purely a surface one. 55 !!.!!, Nation, of March 29, 
1933, refers to the portion of the President's inaugural speech 
in which he demanded that, "the money changers be driven out ot 
the templen, but, continued the writer1 those money changers, big 
New York bankers, bad gone to Washington to contribute their bit 
to the act of legislation which became the Emergency Banking 
Act. 56 
The most favorable opportunity tor rebuilding the banking 
structure of the United States, presented itself in March of 1933 
simultaneously with the collapse. Guy Greer, author of "Wanted: 
Real Banking Reform", Harpera, (Oct. 1933), intimated that a 
genuinely national commercial banking system might have been con-
structed trom the •debris of the forty•n1ne assorted eyatema which 
had broken down.•57 The moratorium, 1ta purpose and effects, was 
still fresh in the minds of the people. While in that mental 
state, they through their representatives in Congress might have, 
with comparative ease, brought about the enactment or worthwhile 
banking reforms. True, emergency measures were enacted, but 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
E.F.Bro'l'lll, "America Meets the Emergency", 
(May, 1933). Vol. 38, P• 203. 
The Nation, (Mar. 29, 1933). Vol. 136. P• 
lbfd. --
~Greer, •wanted: Real Banlcing Reform," 
Vol. 167.p.533. 
~nt H1storz. 
330.ed. 
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there was no follow up by the passage of laws which would estab-
lish a "single system adequate tor the needs of the Nation."58 
Glancing backward for a moment, we recall that from several 
sources, we had been made aware ot the fact, that bank failures 
did not begin with the depreaaion. Several thousand had failed 
during the seemingly proeperoua years. In Bankers Monthly, ot 
November, 1929, Mr. H. B. Stronck, author of Bank Administration, 
made the statement that between 1921 and 1928 5004 banks bad 
suspended. 59 The natural suspicion should be., that something waa 
wrong with the banking system. When the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency began its investigation, it round, as had 
been suspected, that Federal Reserve funds bad been uaed tor 
speculative purpoaes.so 
It was Ernest K. Lindley who wrote "Wall Street Undor the 
New Deal", Literarz Digest, (July 22, 1~33) and in it said that 
one did not have to accept the theory which made the depreaaion 
the outcome or the frenzied speculation of 1929, in order to 
condemn the leaders in the banking world, for their failure to 
58. 
59. 
60. 
HaJiiers, Vol. 1671 P• 533. 
Jo f. Flfllll, "Wanted: Real Banking Retormn, current H1atol'Ji 
(Jan. 1934) Vol. 39, P• 394. Also E.F.Brown., "Roosevelt Takes 
Control", Current Hietorz, (Apr. 1933) Vol. :58. P• 83; 
Bradford, p. 461; George Soule, "A Program for Banking•, New 
Republic, (Var. 29, 1933) Vol. 74, P• 176; Bankers Montblf;'""'" 
Rand Mclally and co., Chgo. (Nov. 1929) PP• 3o-!2. 
Bradford, P• 462. 
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avert speculative exceaaes.61 The inquiry, made by the Senate 
Banking Committee, showed among those, who were leaders or the 
"wild rush up-hill and over the precipice", referring of course 
to speculation, were the heada ot some of the country-ta largest 
62 banks. The House of Morgan was among these. 
Once again Senator Glaae had gone about bis work on a bank-
ing reform bill, which was introduced in the Senate on March 17, 
1932. He was determined that no changes should be made in the 
section which wae intended to check stock market speculation. It 
was understood that some New York bankere were making every pos-
sible effort to prevent passage of the bill. They objected to 
the separating of investment and commercial bank1ng. 63 
On the other hand, Senator Glass waa not an advocate ot 
guarantee of bank deposits, and thia was the pet issue ot Repre-
sentative Steagall who was the Chairman of the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency. The latter's bill was passed in the House 
on May 27, 1932, but did not come to a vote in the Senate; where-
as the Glass bill had not been passed by the House.64 
The bill wae modified and reintroduced in the 73d Congress. 
One strong Congressional group wanted its immediate passage; but 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
Ernest K. Lindley, "Wall Street Under the New Deal", L1terarz 
D1~eet, (July 1933) Vol. 116, P• 4. 
tl erary Digest, (July 1933) Vol. 116, p. 4. 
The New York Times, Mar. 18, 1932. Also Mar. 19, 1932; The 
Viii'iiii'ia Week, (May 24, 1933) P• 32. ---
The New RepuE11c, (Feb. 1933) Vol. 73, P• 325 ed; The Bus1-
iiiia-wie~, (Apr. 12, 1933) P• 3; Congressional Digiit,~ 
(Apr.-i93'3) Vol. 12, P• 97. 
l 
so. 
it became evident, that unless it was made a part of the Pres!• 
dent•s emergency program., its passage was doubtfu1. 65 
On May 10, 1933, Senator Wheeler presented to the Senate a 
petition from "sundry oitizena" of Montana, requesting Congress 
to "investigate prosecute and convict to the fullest extent of 
the law, it found guilty, the large banking institutions ot New 
York City and elsewhere, especially the Morgan Banking Company, 
New York City, N. Y." This petition was referred to the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency and ordered printed in the Record, 
minus the signatures thereto attaohed. 66 
On June 151 1933, Senator Borah asked that two artiolea, 
relative to Senator Glaaa and hie aot1v1tiea, be printed in the 
Record. His request was granted. One article was taken from the 
9hrist1an Science Monitor, and the other from ~ ~ York Herald 
Tribune ot May 28 1 1933. A quotation trom the latter interests 
us. "In his Federal Reserve retol'Dl bill, he (Senator Glass) 
proposed and propoaea to inflict almost violently drastic punish-
ments upon any undue diversion of Federal credit into speculative 
channela.•67 
From the general trend ot the remainder of the article, it 
is given us to understand that Mr. Gla~s, a Democrat or the old 
65. The Business Week, (Ma7 24, 1933) P• 32. 
66. COiigresa1on8.l-niCord, 73 Cong. l, Sesa. Vol. 77, part 3, 
P• 3106. 
67. Ibid., part 6. PP• 6069-71 • 
............... 
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school, was not in full accord with some of the ideas of Presi-
dent Roosevelt's new dea1. 68 In regard to the President's 
Emergency Banking Bill, "he supported it with all the loyalty 
that was consistent with a simultaneous savage asservation of 
its obnoxiousness to his pr1ne1ples.n69 
President Roosevelt wasn't particularly anxious to have the 
Glass-Steagall banking bill passed at the special session. He 
allowed it to be believed, that he was looking forward to the 
enactment ot legislation, which would be more tar-reaching, in 
the near tuture. 70 Eventually agreement was reached, however, 
and the bill passed both Houses of Congress juat prior to the 
adjournment of the special session. On June 16, 1933, at eleven 
o'clock that morning, President Roosevelt approved the bill which 
71 
"supplements and strengthens" the Federal Reserve Law. 
According to Bradford, the Banking Act ot 1933 was about aa 
satisfactory a b1t of legislation as might have been expected un-
der the c1rcumstancea72 Said Guy Greer, Har~era Magazine, 
68. 
69· 
70. 
71. 
72. 
"The Glass Bill ••• leaves the basic elements 
of weakness in our banking structure essen-
tially the same aa before. It does indeed 
str1ke ••• at some of the most spectacular 
abuses which have occurred in the employment 
Ibid., Also L1tera~ Di§eat, (July 22,1933) Vol. 116, P• 31. 
?JOrlgresa1onaI Reco , 7 Cong.lfSess.Vol.77, part 6, p. 6071. 
t1£erary D!~ea£, Vol. 116, P• 3 • 
The Ne1'Yor Tlmea, June l7r 1933. Also Bradford, P• 463; 
"ffi.irrent !Iito~, (Jan. l934J Vol. 39, p. 399; Ibid., 
tneo. 1934) Vo • 41. P• 259. -
Bradford, P• 471. 
of bank credit for speculat1on ••• The moat re-
assuring aspect ••• 1s that through the insurance 
plan it holds the hope of eventual unification 
of all commercial banking under federal control. 
Possibly this will provide an opportunity tor 
the grad¥al development or a genuine national 
system." ~ 
82. 
The Nation through ~ editorial voiced the opinion that all 
persons who have an interest in sound banking must approve some 
of the provisions or the new Glass-Steagall Act, particularly the 
provision which compels the separation ot security affiliates 
from commercial banka, and the one which forbids a bank to grant 
any of 1ts officers a loan. As to the provision whioh guarantees 
bank deposits, there was some akept1e1em, part1o'darly, since 
states which had previously tried the guaranty plan had abandoned 
1t.74 
Briefly stated, the Banking Act ot 1933 (Glass-Steagall 
Banking Reform Bill) is directed toward a, 
73. 
74. 
75. 
" •••• unified banking system; provides a limi-
ted deposit guarantee; requires divorcement 
or security affiliates from banks under gov-
ernment supervision; compels private banks 
to give up either the deposit or security 
business; requirea stricter regulation ot 
national banks; forbids loans by banks to 
their oft1cera; seeks to limit the volume or 
loans to be made on stocks obvioualy tor the 
purpose of speculation; and provided the 
means for direct removal of bank officers who 
-are known to be guilty of undesirable oonduct."75 
Guy Greer, "Wanted• Real Banking Reform", ~arpere,(Oct. 1933) 
Vol. 167. PP• 533•35. 
The Nation, (June 28, 1933) Vol. 136, PP• 709-10 ed\t 
ifJ:ii New York Timea, June 17, 1933; Aleo H. Parker Willia, 
;~r~9~rn~r~~ 11::;;, i~tr:it:JAi&a3a!tocg:%obl~3t~3X~1 • 39 ' 
PP• l5o-e4. - - -
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After the passage of the bill, the Federal Reserve Board an-
nounced that non-aff111'ated banka had already- begun to make ap-
plication tor membership 1n the Federal Reserve Syatem. 76 It waa 
still obvious, however, that even though enacted, the bill waa 
not well received by the American Bankers Association. Its presi-
dent, Francis H. Sisson, of New York, stated that the Glaae• 
Steagall Banking Act was not a baa1cally sound measure, and that 
1t would eventually enforce lta own repeai. 77 He further atated 
that bankers regretted that Senator Glass and the members ot the 
Banking Committee "have yielded to importunities and included a 
so-called insurance of deposits plan in the banking reform bill •• n78 
George V. McLaughlin, president ot New York State Bankers 
Association, felt that the Act was the "fruit of much careful 
study and honest thou.&ht+" He felt, too, that there had been no 
desire to penaliae banks, but an aim to strengthen the country's 
banking syatem. 79 
Winthrop w. Aldrich, Chairman Governing Board and President 
or Chaae National· Bank, New York City, wae entirely in aympath:y 
with the "divorcing by law of security aff111atea from commercial 
80 banka. 0 Mr. A• A. Berle Jr. a member ot President Roosevelt's 
s::>-called 9 bra1n trust•, stated that the Act was a "transitional 
76. The New York Times, June 17, 1933. 
77. 'ffii' New Yori !lmea, June 23, 1933. 
78. !1ii !iiikers »a9az!ne, (June 1933) Vol. 126, P• 563. 
79. ldim., (July l 33) Vol. 127, p. 109. 
ao. Iaem., (Apr. 1933) Vol. 126, P• 305. 
-
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measure and that more new banking legislation should be ex-
pected. 081 
It was therefore in accordance with the proviaione of the 
, Banking Act of 1933 that bankers, either willingly or unwillingly, 
began to set their houses in order, ao that their reorganization 
might be completed. Further legislation, such as was predicted 
by Mr. Berle, culminated in the Banking Act ot 1935. We shall 
not. however, concern ourselves with this legislation. 
That the banking situation throughout the country waa on the 
upgrade was indicated in a broadcast interview on June 18, 1933, 
during which Louie McHenry Howe, secretary to President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, stated that or the 4887 banks which closed, 
only 1005 had so remained.82 It was Walter Lippmann, who very 
adequately said, "A year ago, men were living from hour to hour, 
in the midst of a crisis or enormous proportions, and all they 
could think about was how they could survive 1t." Then speaking 
as of February- 27, 1934, he said• "the mass or people have re-
covered their courage and their hope. They are no longer hys-
terically anxious about the immediate present. They have re-
covered not only some small part of their standard of lite, but 
83 
also their selt-posaeasion." 
81. fbe New York Times, June 27, 1933. 
82. The New !Ork Times, June 19, 1933. 
83. tfPpiiiiiiin-;-!iiterpretations 1933-1935, P• 249. 
CHAPTER VII. 
1907-06 VERSUS 1929·33-------------
Comparative study of the causes, 
effects, results, similarities and 
d1as1milar1t1es. 
CHAPTER VII. 
1907-08 VERSUS 1929•33 
It is the purpose or this chapter to serve as a comparative 
digest of the two crises. Most statements herein have been ac-
counted for in previous chapters; therefore footnotes shall be 
made only tor additional c1tationa. 
Our two cr1ees had the appearance ot having come out ot a 
clear sky; but events show that each had been years in the 
making. (~here were some .features ot a1m1lar1t7 1n each, for fun-
damentally each was the result of too great act1v1tr in the 
fields open to speculation. 
The word speculation generally causes one to vizualize an 
activity which is associated with persons of huge income, and an 
accomparqing amount ot leisure, which may be spent in a form ot 
luxurious living, provided by the returns of their speculative 
ventures. In part, the above is true. 
In 1907 and 1929, the symptoms of the approaching crises 
> ... 
were almost identical. 1t\\ages had reached. an unpr.effde.nt:ed: high; 
luxuries were everywhere; and speculation was rampant. In the 
earli~r pani o the apeculat1 ve movement was .. confined to the 
,r , : ... , 1 I 1 ,, .. • 1ll~y.d people. Whereas, in the Liatjter, men and women of moder-
ate means, who saw a chance to get something through the least 
85. 
86. 
expenditure of labor or effort, floundered about with thoae or 
wealt:q,,. __ J.n the whirlpool of speculation. 
<'-
Just as many had placed the blame for the panic ot 1907 
upon President Theodore Roosevelt, _.eo, ·the Hoover Administration 
was s:lmilatt117 charged tor the depreaeing conditions of 1929-33. 
In the latter instance, it was said, that t:l:le Republicans had 
taken the reins of the Government at a time when America was 
looked upon as the strongest nation in the world; but that they 
left her a weakened and divided America, whose faith 1n God and 
l in herself had waned. 
,/ ~. ·~ 
The breakdown, in the ea.Plier ~:rt1a1s 1 was prec1p1 tated by 
the combat between the monarchs ot Wall Street, and F. Augustus 
Heinze and hie affiliates. The heels or the recognized powers 
had come down upon the heads ot the would•be usurpers, because 
of their interests in copper. 
' ,·· 
/ ::;.~·.•.,., '.' . .'-
In the- more--»~-"Oataatrophe, the depression was ushered 
.... ,, .. _,,,, .. ~. ~··-- . -· ,. , ...... , .. ... . .. ' 
in by the atoek market crash of October 1929. - Such had come 
:~'.'.-~'.' -' :. ·r:··· ' / d.} 
about because of the failure or banking heads to h1nftrwarn1ngs 
against the granting or doubt.ful loans, and against wild specu-
lation. 
When busineas aat1v1t1ee were slowed down by bank rune and 
hoarded currency in 1907 premiums were ottered for currency, and 
_) 
1. Bernard Fay, Roosevelt and His America, (Little Brown and co., 
Boston, 1933). p. 163. ---~ 
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Clearing House oert1t1catea were resorted to as a meana ot aiding 
the return or normal oond1t1ona. The uae ot Clearing Houser cer-
tificates was anticipated in the latter crisis. Although they 
were printed and made ready for circulation, they did not come 
into uae, tor in the Emergency Banking Bill, a provision was 
made tor the issuance of additional currency. 
The outstanding ditterenc~ in the two disturbances,.,... was 
that the latter, with its epidemic of bank failures, was more 
widespread and generally more disastrous. because it continued 
longer. In the latter, too, the average man suffered most. 
Funds which he had deposited in the local bank against a rainy 
day were wiped away. 
In the wake of the panic of 1907 came the ref orma in bank-
ing. The first ot these, the Postal Savings System, provided tor 
Postal Savings bank@,- to encourage thrirt,.. by providing safe de-
pos1 tor1ea for those who had lost faith in ordinary banking in-
stitutions. In Government depositories there was safet71ror. -lHF'.~ 
--q,.A• ea!:i.t payment or depos1 ts was solemnly pledged by the 
Government. The second, the Federal Reserve System, was estab-
lished under the Act which not only made for the establishment 
of Federal Reserve banks, but which would furnish an elastic 
currency, and a more adequate supervision of banking 1n the 
United States. 
" I ea. 
,•/ f': 
With these reforms, it was felt that future -..e•i·l:!:ng;-era---r ...... r 
as bankingwas--eoncerned, would .be smooth sailing. Thus protec-
ted, the country was soon calm and undisturbed. Years passed, and 
;r;~ ... ~:r 
then broke the rec8f1·t··atorm. Strange as it may seem, it was 
found that the Federal Reserve System, which had been inaugurated 
to make impossible the recurrence of conditions such oa charac-
terized the financial breakdown in 1907, had been, to a certain 
extent, an aid to those who were to a large degree responsible 
for the 1929 crash. 
To block further abuse or the system, remedta1 legislation 
was again sought. In the meantime, many bewildered depositors 
withdrew their funds, and redeposited them in the Postal Savings 
~ 1nstitut1ons, ~e-·oari'klng ·haven ot those-- t1m1-d:-1:trarr11'.lttal.e .who 
had f alt-h---on-ly in the ·Government • 
In Congress, political views! constitutional pr1v1legea, and 
personal oonviotions regarding adequate banking legislation, were 
for the time being1 put aside to speed up such action as the 
President deemed necessary to bring the country out ot chaos. In 
so doing, Congress was most certainly expressing the desires of 
a panic stricken populace. 
In due se~son, two acts or legislation amended the Federal 
Reserve Aet. As these have been discussed at length in chapters 
five and six, your attention is merely directed to the Glaee-
89. 
Steagall Act of February 27, 1932, enacted during the Hoover 
Administration, and the new Glass-Steagall Bill commonly known as 
the Banking Act of 1933, enacted during the Administration of 
President F. D. Roosevelt. 
In 1907-08 no great part was played by President Theodore 
Roosevelt in stabilizing the financial structure of the country. 
Contrary-wise, in 1929-32, efforts were made by President Herbert 
Hoover to bring about some adjustment or conditions. Ria attempts 
were followed by the very unusual but effective measures of Pres!• 
cent Franklin D. Roosevelt. Remedial legislation, in the earlier 
instance, was enacted in the two succeeding administrations. In 
the latter caae, such legislation began in the stricken admini-
stration and was completed in the following one. 
It may be reasonably concluded that there waa nothing in the 
earlier crisis which was in any way comparable to: the Recon-
struction Finance Corpcration; the banking moratorla; the 
Elnergenoy Banking Act; the loyalty of a political pa~ty to a 
President; and the--~ffented. precision with which a program, 
aimed at banking rehabilitation,- was legislated. 
According to Lippmann, "the president had the insight to 
see that ~he crisis was fundamentally political in the sense that 
the people had become contuaed and frightened because the govern-
ment and their institutions were paralyzed and impotent. Seeing 
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this, he took the decision to ask Congress for a concentration of' 
power in the executive. That was what broke the panic, opened 
the banks, restored the morale of the nation .... "2 
Speaking of the President's success, Fay attributed it to 
his boldness, shrewdness, and knowledge; and classified him as 
being the "greatest living pol1t1c1an."3 
Having been severely dealt with, it m91 be some time before 
the average American citizen dares to risk his all, as in 1929. 
Those whose financial status enables them to tempt -t~~B'""of' 
speculat~ill find that tte.iMtnt banking legislation has enabled 
loana to be made which would supplement their funds tor such pur-
poses, lees easily obtained. 
~ moat fitting statement with which to bring t1tft' contrasts 
to ~/16if:a,~- comes from an editorial in the June a, 19331 The 
-
Business Week. It informs us that the leather seats ot the 
brokers' otfides are again being occupied by the momentary m1l-
11ona1res of 1929. Too, the average man 1a watching the market 
quotations. There 1s, howe~er, something different in their 
emotions. Formerly, as they watched, they had a conviction that 
prices would continue to rise; but, said the writer, "experience 
has shown that the most amiable stock may turn and bite !ta 
2. Lippmann, p. 263. 
3. Fay, P• 344. 
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owner."' We may, as long as this attitude continues, be reason-
,~. ,f·J i 
ably secure against a cr1a1s of such lne&ption..,; in the near 
future. But, we must keep in mind Thomas Jefferson's philosophi-
cal remark, as quoted by Charles Warren in Bankruptcy !!! the 
United States, 
"No man of reflections wl:ohad ever applied 
the lessons of the paat to the present time, 
could fail to foraee the issue though he might 
not calculate the moment at which it would hap-
pen ••• All that stuff called scrip, ot whatever 
description, waa folly or roguery, and under a 
resemblence to genuine public paper 1t buoyed 
itself up to a par with that. It has been a 
severe lesson; yet such is the public gullib1l-
1 t7. in the hands of cunning and unprincipled 
men, that it is doomed by nature to receive 
these lessons once in an age at least. "5. · 
4. The Business Week, (July 8, 1933) P• 18. 
5. ~rles Warren;-Bankruptcy in the United States, (Harvard 
Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mas&. 'rn!5) P• 12. 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
While engaged in research, the writer came upon much materi-
al pertinent to the thesis. These materials may be listed under 
four specific headings, namely: Government Documents, Periori-
cals, Newspapers, and Books. Each type had an especial value. 
Government documents were the authentic records or remedial legie-
lat1on, Newspapers and periodicals provided all contemporary' 
d1seuas1ons of events which had a direct bearing upon our topic. 
Worthwhile books were rew in number, but these were helptul in 
supplying some background data, and some current information. 
To expedite the use of this bibliography, d1via1ona have 
been made which correspond to the chapter divia1ona. Each ot 
these is, in turn, arranged according to types of articles used. 
HISTORY OF .BANKING PRIOR TO 1907 
Some exceedingly fine material, relative to the earlier 
period, is found in Frederick A. Bradford, Monet ~ Banking, 
Longmans Green and Co., N. Y., 1936. Its bibliograpb:J' 1• moat 
excellent. On a whole, however, thia publication is more useful 
for the latter part of the thesis. A few brier statements per-
tinent to the controversy over the establishment of the· First and 
Second United States Banks, may be obtained from Harold R. Bruce, 
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American Parties ~Politics, Henry Holt and Co., N. Y., 1936. 
Charles A. Conant, ! ~isto!7 !!!. Modern Banks .2.! Issue, G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, N. y., 1915, is a valuable secondary source. 
For general information regarding the financial structure ot 
the United States before 190'7, Davis R. Dewey, Financial Histon 
.2f ~ United States, Longmana Green and Co., N. Y., 1928, ia 
excellent. Thia book haa ample footnotes dealing with the sour-
ces. Roy L• Garis, ~rlnc1elea £!. Kon•l• Credit ~ Bankipg, 
Macmillan co., H• Y~, 1934 1 may alao be used~ 
There are several volumes which contain the text of speeches 
made for and againat the chartering or the United States Banks• 
Statements made by Alexander Hamilton mq be found in The Works 
----
2! Alexander Hamilton--Comprisil!S !!!.!. ~ Important Off1cial 
Reports; !!! Improved Edition .2.f ~ Federalists, -2!!. The !.!! 
Constitution Written in 1778 and Pac1f1cus on the Proclamation of 
........ ..,__.;...;;..,;...;.;..o.......,-. -~~-- --- ----- --- ---- ---
Neutralitl Written !!! ~· published by William and Whiting, 
N. Y•, 1810• 
For expressions made by Andrew Jack.eon against the recharter-
ing or the bank, aee the following: Great Debates !!!, American 
Historr, edited by Marion M. Miller, CUrrent Literature Pub. co., 
N. Y., 1913; J. A. Richardson, ! Compilation£!_ !a! Mea&!,688 ~ 
Papers .2.! !e!. Presidents ~--~, Published bf the authority 
of Congress, 1900; and the .!!!2 Message .2! President Andrew 
94. 
Jackson _2!! Returning !a! ~ ~ ~ ~ Senate ~ Bia Objec-
tions, Jul7 10, 1832 Together ~ !!!! Speech gt, Bon. Daniel 
Webster, Relative to the Same, published by the National Repub-
---~-- -- --- ----
lican Central Committee Journal Preas, (no cop7r1ght date). It 
is a ver, old publication. 
Arthur Scbleainger, Political ~ Social History S?!. ~ 
United States 1829•1925, Macmillan co., N. Y., 1928, deala brief-
ly with the investments undertaken by banka prior to 1907. 
PERIODICALS used tor this period were .rew. Ard rew Carnegie, 
"The Worat Banking System in the World", Outlook, Outlook Co., 
N. Y., (Fe. 1908) Vol. 88, is good. An interesting bit of materi• 
al is contained in an editorial which appears in The Nation, Bew 
----
York Evening Post Co., N. Y., (Oct. 1907) Vol. 85. 
The most valuable periodical article is E.A. Goldenweiae~, 
"Highlights in History o.r American Banking Legislation," ~­
greaaional Digest, Munse7 Bldg.; Wash. D. D. (Dec. 1931) Vol. 10. 
Dr. Goldenweiser is director, Division of Research and Statistics 
of the Federal Reserve Board, and hie article is very tactual. 
BANKING CRISIS IN THE PANIC OF 1907 
Material dealing with the pan1o ot 1907 1a o.r var,1ng degrees 
ot value. The Heinze affair which is the nucleus ot the cataatro• 
phe, is discussed in Charles A. Collman, .Q!!.£ M1aterioua Panics 
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1830-1930, William Morrow and Co., N. Y. 1931, and inc. B •. 
Glaasock, !!!!, War .2£. ~ Copper K1nga 1 Builders !! Butte !!!,!! 
Wolves .2! !.!!.! _s_t_r_e_e_t, The Bobba•Merrill co., N. Y• 1935. Mr. 
Olaesock used newspaper tiles, magazines, and mader personal in-
terviews, while in queat ot his material. This book is moat 
enlightening. It deals with the activities ot F. Auguatua 
Heinze, first aa a miner, then as a man of Wall Street. 
Clement Juglar, ! Br1et Riston; .!!.!: Panics ~ Their Period· 
!.2!Y:, Occurrence ,!!! .!a!!!. _u_n1_te_d_ ..,.s .... t .... a... te.,..e . , C. P. Putnam' a Sona, N. Y., 
1916, is as 1ts title suggeate, brief, but uaetul. It is trana-
lated by Decoursey w.· Thoma, former member of the Baltimore Stock 
Exchange and ot the Consolidated Exchange ot New York. 
PAMPHLETS which, when checked against other factual mater!-
• 
ala do not savor of a biased viewpoint, and which therefore are 
of value, are: Pan1oa !E:2: Depreas1ona, issued by State Title and 
Mortgage Company, New York, 1935J N. Johannsen, !!!!. Comip.g Cr1a1a 
and How to Meet It, N. Y. 1906, which is a plea tor eurrency re-
~ - --- __.__. ._..... 
form; Harriet Heald, Hiatorz 2f Industrial De~resaiona, published 
by the Cleveland Trust co., 1912, attempte to show that the finan-
cial difficulties or the depression ot 1907-08 paved the way for 
the Federal Reserve System. 
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NEWSPAPER articles were of exceedingly great value as pri-
mary sources. The Chicago ;Qaily Tribune and the ~ rn Dailz 
Tribune, all 1saues for the months or October and November, 
1907, contained a wealth of material through which one might 
follow the daily progression ot affairs, throughout the eountr,y. 
PERIODICALS proved to be vivid sources. Among these were: 
Alexander Noyes, "Articles in Finance", Forum, Forum Pub. co., 
N. Y. (Jan 1908); editorial in The Nation, New York Evening 
----
Post co., N. Y., (Nov. 1907); and·~ Spectator~·• edited by 
John Baker, London, (Oct. 26, 1907). The latter periodical, 
which is sprinkled with English wit, is quite illuminating, 
THE POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM 
For material on the Postal Savings Banks, one may consult 
Edwin w. Kemmerer, PoAtal Savings, Princeton Univ. Presa, 1917. 
This ie a very detailed explanation of the system, accompanied 
by an appendix which contained the full text of the Postal 
Savings Act. 
PERIODICALS: Vols. 90, .91, 92 and 94 or Outlook, contain 
editorials on the Postal Savings Banks. In Vol. 91, (Jan. 1909) 
is an article written by John Harsen Rhoades, "Postal Savings 
Banks." It is very informative. In!!!!_ Independent, published 
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by Independent, N. Y., (Nov. 5, 1908) Vol. 65, ia George Von L. 
Meyer, "Much Needed Legislation", in wnich he discusses the advan-
tages or the system, as applied 1n other countries. In the same 
publication 1a Charles E. Sprague, npoatal Saving• Banks". Then 
we find Harold Stone, "The Postal Savings-Bank a Suggestion", 
North American Review, North American Review Pub. Co., N. Y., 
(Apr. 19, 1910) Vol. 191. !h!. Craftsman, Gustav Stickley, edi-
tor and publisher, B. Y., (Apr. 1908) Vol. 14 contains the 
editorial, "Postal Service Extenaion--What Postal Banks and a 
Cheap Etficient Parcel Poat Would Mean to the Farmer and Wage 
The Arena, A Twentieth Cent'!IX Review !l.! Opinion, Albert 
Brandt Pub. Co., Boston, (Mar. 1909) Vol. 41, includes an ed1· 
torial, "Postal Savings-Banks and the Interests ot the People," 
and a publication or the Commercial National Bank ot Chicago, 
conta1na, "Objections to a Postal Savings Bank," Address by 
George B. Roberts, President of that institution, delivered be-
fore the Minnesota State Bankers Association, at its Annual 
Meeting, (June 15, 1909). In the Congressional Digest, (Dec. 
1931) Vol. 10, is "Postal Savings System", an Extract from 
Pamphlets issued by the United States Poatoffice Department. 
DOCUMENTS too are splendid sources. Remarks by Senator 
Bourne, advocating the establiebment of Postal Savings Deposi-
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toriea, are to be found in ~ongreasional Record, 61 Oong. 2. Seas. 
(Mar. 5, 1910). Additional material appears in the 60 Copg. 2. 
Seaa.(Jan. 6, 1909). For the text or the Act, see Statute& at 
-----
Lars~ !11. United states gt_ America, Concurrent Resolutions ~ ~ 
!!2. Housea !:.!. Cop.gresa, Government Print. Office. Wash. 1911. 
Vol. 36, part I; and Hearings Before ~ Committee _2!! Banking 
!!!5!, Currenc;r u. s. Senate 63 Cone;. l. Seas. Vol. 3. 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
Books previously mentioned, but which contain material rela-
tive to this topic are: Frederick Bradford, Money ~ BankinSJ 
Charles A. Conant, ! lilatorz ££. Modern Banks .2! Issue; and Davia 
R. ~wey, Financial Hiatoq .2! ~United Statea. 
Special worke on the Federal Reserve System ares Henrr Jonea 
Ford, Wood:rtow Wilson The Man and His Work, D. Appleton and co., 
-------· - ----- ----- -- ............................. 
N. y., 1915• which gives the attitude or Mr. Wilson on the matter 
of currency reform; Carter Glass, An Adventure in Constructive - - _________ ......_.__..._ 
Finance, (Doubleday Page and Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1927J 
which is very splendid material written by a sponsor or the Act; 
Wm. G. P, Harding, Formative ·Period £?.!. !!°!!. Federal Reserve .§z!.-
tem, (Boughton Mifflin co., 1925,) tells of the organization of 
-
the board and outlines the functions of the Federal Reserve 
Banke; and 11. Wilson Harria, President Wilson .!!!!. Problem ~ 
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!!!! Policz, Headl91 Bros., Ltd. London, 1918, which 1a brief', but 
good. 
Edwin w. Kemmerer, !!!!, A.B.C • ..J?! !!!!.. Federal Reserve Syatem, 
Princeton Univ. Preas, 1926, prefaced by Benjamin Strong, then 
Governor of Federal Reserve Bank ot New York; J. L. Laughlin. 
!!!!. Federal Reserve ~· ~ Origin ~ Problems, Macmillan co., 
N. Y., 1933; Edward Lewia, ! History .2!, American Political 
Thousht !£2!! ~ Civil !!!£~~World!!:£., Macmillan co., 1937; 
and Robert L. Owen, !!!!, Federal Reserve~. Century Co., N. Y., 
1919, are very helpf'ul. Mr. Owen waa United Statea Senator trom 
Oklahoma, Chairman ot the United States Senate Committee ot 
Banking and Currency. 
Other worthwhile publication• ares Joseph P. Tumulty, ~­
row Wilson As I Know BimJ Paul M. Warburg, The Federal Reserve 
......._.. ......... - __....._, .-......... --
System, Its Origin~ 9rowth, Macmillan ·co., N. Y. 1930. Vol. l; 
William Allen White, Woodrow Wilson, The Man Bis Times, Bia Task, 
- ........... - ....,._ ......___... 
Houghton Mifflin co., Boston, 1924; Henry Parker Willia, ~ 
Federal Reserve System, Roland Preaa, N. Y., 1923, with,.. an intro-
duction by Hon. Carter Glass, who was chairman of the Houae Bank-
ing Committee 1913-18; and Charles M. Wiltse, !h!, Jeffersonian 
Tradition !!! American Democrac7, The Univ. of North Carolina 
Preas, Durham, N. c., 1935. 
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PERIODICAL material ot value is: Dr. E. A. Goldenweiser, 
"Highlights in Histo:r;r of American Banking Legislation"~ Consres• 
sional Digest, (Dec. 1931) Vol. 10; J. M. Dagier, "Bank Failures, 
The Problem and the Remedy", Harpers Magazine, (Apr. 1931) Vol. 
162; editorials 1n The Nation, Vols. 97 and 98; and Outlook, 
----
(Mar. 7, 1914) Vol. 106. 
NEWSPAPER used waa the New York Tribune for September, Octo-
ber and December, 1913. 
DOCUMENTS were used tor the sources of discusaione tor and 
against the Act. The Congresa1onal Record, was invaluable. 
; 
See 
Prooeedinsa ~Debates £.!.. 63 Cong. l. Sese, Also 71 Cong• 3. Seaa. 
6886. For the text or the Federal Reserve Act, consult The 
Federal Reserve Act As Amended to October 1935, compiled under ~~--- ---~---- --- -- -- ~-----.......... ---
the direction ot the Board ot Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System in the Oft1oe of its General Counsel, United Statea. 
Gov•t Print. Ottice, Wash. 1935. 
DEPRESSION OF 1929 
Of the aeeondaJ:t'y sources used, two have been mentioned, 
namely, Bruce and Bradford. Additional information may be tound 
in Bernard Fay, Rooaevelt .!ru!!!!. .America, Little Brown and co., 
Boston, 1933. Mr. Fay gives the idea that America thrives on 
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oriaea. A conc1ae bit of material ls to be found in Paul H. Doug-
las, Collapse ~ Qy:cle, The Lakeside Press, Chicago, 1933. Irving 
Fisher, The Stock Market Crash and After, Macmillan Co., N. Y., 
- ----
1930, makes an attempt to appraise the crash of 1929. Joseph 
Stagg Lawrence, Wall Street ~ Washington, Princeton Univ. Presa, 
1929, discuasea the Problema of the Federal Reserve Board in 1929. 
P~RIODICALS were ot great help. Frederick A. Delano, "Our 
Recent Crisis and the Future", Review .2£ Reviews, Review ot Re-
views Corp. N• Y., (Dec. 1932) Vol. 86, contained much useful 
material. An editorial whioh la fairly good was found in !!!!_ 
Tablet, The Tablet Office, London, (Nov. 2, 1929). Thia ot courae 
gives the English viewpoint, aa doea s. K. Ratol1fte, "How America 
Sees Herselt", !.!!.! Spectator, (MAJ' 28, 1932) Vol. 148J and Norm.an 
Crump, "The American Banking Cria1a", ~Nineteenth Cent1:117 !!2, 
Arter, (Constable and co., Ltd., London) (Jan. 193~) Vol.113, 
which deals with the banking angle ot the depression. 
In Current B1sto!"I, are two articles: Bernhard Oatrolenk, 
·~ the Banks Collapsed", (May, 193~) Vol. 38; and Alexander D. 
Noyes, "The Stock Market Panic", (Dec. 1929) Vol. 31. 
Deep insight ae to the extent or speculation during thia 
period is expressed editorially in, !!!!. L1V11?:£i Age, The Living Age 
Co., N. Y., {Dec. 1929) Vol. 337. Previously mentioned, but ex-
~ellent for this phase of our work are: Jobn M. Dagier, 
lot,, 
nchallenge to the Banke•, World'a .!2.£!1 (Oct. 1931) Vol. 80J ant 
the Borth .American Review, Vol. 229. 
A ver., tine art1~le, on the Reoonatruotion Finance Corpopa. 
t1on and 1te act1v1t1ea 1 ia, Jeaae H. Jonea, "B11l1ona Out and 
Billion• Back", I!!! Saturdy: Bv•nle& l.2!!• The Curtie Pub. co., 
Philadelphia, (June 12, 1937). 
As it has been alread7 stated, NEWSPAPEftB, recording the 
da117 eventa, are moat valuable aa well aa illuminating. Those 
which were 1ndeapena1ble were: The Chic!io Dailz !!!!,J Ch1C!gO 
Daill Tr1buneJ Chicag~ Herald Examiner; !a! .!!.! !2£! Herald 
Tribune; The Bew York TimeaJ and London T1aea1 tor October, 
------
1929, and ror Februarr and March, l9S2. 
DOCUMEITARf aouroea available were: Hearing• Betore ~ 
Committee ga Banking ,!.!!!! Currenoi1 House s£ ftepreeentat1vea, 72 
Cong. 1. 8•••• on H. R. 9203, United Statea Gov't Print. Otfioe, 
Waah. (Feb. 12, 1932)J The Federal Reaerve Bulletin, (Mar. 1932); 
- --- --- ----
and Consreea1onal Record 72 Cong. 1, 8•••• Vol. 7§ 1 part '• 
INSTABILI'l'Y OP BANKING 
Bradtord, Mon!l ~ Banking, waa helpful tor thia portion 
of the theaia also. c. c. Colt and 11. s. Ke1,h1 28 pqa, A Bla-
!2!% 2£. !!:!! Banking Oria1a, Greeberg Pub. Co., x. Y., 19331 1a 
10&. 
what may be called·a daily hiatol'J' of events dealing to a great 
extent with the banking or1a1a, particularly in Michigan. Of 
interest 1a Herbert Hoover, .American Ideala Versus the Hew Deal, 
------
Scribner Presa, N. Y., (no publisher's date). 
Walter Lippmann, ;nterEretat1ona 1933•1935, Selected and 
Edited by' Allan Nevina, Macmillan co., N. Y., 1936, is an excel-
lent compilation of concurrent writings by a man, who because of 
h1s years ot experience with leading newspapera in New York, did 
much to aid the Roosevelt campaign. Certain parts ot his book 
are pertinent to our subject. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, .Q!! .2'!!£. Waz, The Jobn Da1 co., 
N. Y., 1934, is the President's own explanation of the s1gn1ti-
cant events ot the first year of his adm1niatrat1on. The banking 
situation is only one of the many detailed discussions. 
In the field ot PERIODICALS, World Tomorrow, The world 
Tomorrow Inc., N. Y., (Mar. 1933) Vol. 16, oontaina two 1plendid 
editorials: "The Banking Cria1a•, and ·•1fho Are Slacker•"• 
' Volumes 38, 39, and 41 of Current Historz, are helptul. E. P. 
Brown, "America Meets the Emergency" and "Roosevelt Takes Con-
trol" are in Vol. 38; J. T. Flynn, "Wantedi Real Banking Retorm• 
in Vol. 39. Mr. Flynn 1a very highly regarded, if one accepts · 
the opinions registered in I!!!, ~ Rev1ew D16!at. 
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Editorials b1 Albert Shaw, Review ot Reviews, Review ot 
Reviews Corp., N. Y., 1934, Vol. 90, contain information of value. 
Jesse H. Jones, "Billions Out and Billions Back", Saturdar !'!!!!-
ins !2,!!1 (June 12, 1937) is of use here also. Others which are 
helptul are: Raymond Gram Swing, "The Inevitable .American Cuaah", 
Fortn15htl1 Review, Fortn1ghtl1 Review O.f.f1ce, London, 1933, Vol. 
139, PP• 409-21; Guy Greer, "Wanted& Real Banking Reform", 
HarR•r• Masazine, (Oct. 1933) Vol. 16?; PP• 633-35; and editori-
als in Congre1aional Diseat, Vols. 11, 12, and 13. 
The Nation, The Nation Inc., N. Y., 1933, Vol. 136, contains 
----
editorial matter ot interest. The Business Week, McGraw-Bill 
- -
Pub. Inc., N. Y., (Mar.-Apr. 1933) edited by' Marc. A. Rose, fur~ 
niahes good editorial mat,erial. The May issue also has articles 
on bankings and the June issue contains matel'ial on the new Glaaa-
Steagall Bill. Vol. 151 ot Ia!. Spectator, previous~1 mentione~, 
gives again the English view ot the American banking situation. 
~ !!.!. Re2ublic, Vols. 73 and 74 contains fair editorials on 
our subject. These have been cited betore. 
NEWSPAPERS wh1eh were moat enlightening are: Chicago Dailz 
Tribune, London Times, Manchester Guardian, and Tbe New York 
---
Times, ror the month of Karch, 1933. The New York T1mea waa 
-------
also or great value for 1te news relating to the-Banking Act 
ot 1933. March 1932 and June 1933 1aauea were used for this. 
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DOCUMBITARY aoUl'c•• are again, Oongreaa1onal Record .7! 
Congreaa, I S•••• Vol. 77, ot wb1oh parts l, 3 and 6, were ve17 
helptul for material on the Bankins Act ot 1933; and .!a!. Federal 
Reserve Act Aa A.mended to October, 1935. The latter was used tor ----- _ __. ....... ........., ... __ _
the text of the Banking Act ot 1933. 
The cloa1ng quotation ot Chapter VII 1a taken tram Charle• 
Warren, Bankruptcz ,!!'!~United Statea,(Barvard University 
Presa, Cambridge, Mase. 1935). In thia book Mr. Warren aketchea 
the great depressions of the past and gives a desor1pt1on ot tb.e 
attempts to secure adjustments b7 leg1alat1on. 
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